Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, D-24306 Plön, Germany.
J Theor Biol. 2012 Apr 21;299:139-43. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.014. Epub 2011 Mar 31.
Recent developments in the study of social dilemmas have revealed various cooperative solutions of the "tragedy of the commons" problem. If the public goods game, i.e. the experimental paradigm of the tragedy of the commons, offers the opportunity to punish (the 'stick'), contributions to the public pool usually increase. Direct rewarding (the 'carrot') has been shown to be less effective. If, however, the social dilemma is embedded in a richer context, in which either a good reputation for cooperativeness or mutual rewarding independently pays, cooperation in the PG game may be sustained at high levels. Yet, the proposed mechanisms vary in their efficiency and whether or not in the framework, which combines the stick with the carrot; punishment is strongly reduced compared to just having the punishment option. We review and analyze the relevant literature and discuss the discrepancies.
近年来，对社会困境的研究揭示了各种合作解决方案，可以解决“公地悲剧”问题。如果公共物品博弈，即“公地悲剧”的实验范例，提供了惩罚（“大棒”）的机会，那么对公共池的贡献通常会增加。事实证明，直接奖励（“胡萝卜”）的效果较差。然而，如果社会困境嵌入到更丰富的环境中，其中合作的良好声誉或相互奖励独立地得到回报，那么在 PG 游戏中的合作可能会维持在较高水平。然而，所提出的机制在效率上存在差异，并且在结合了大棒和胡萝卜的框架中，惩罚是否存在；与仅仅具有惩罚选项相比，惩罚大大减少。我们回顾和分析了相关文献，并讨论了差异。
