Information Systems Department, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Switzerland.
Information Systems Department, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Switzerland.
J Theor Biol. 2014 Mar 7;344:40-8. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.11.018. Epub 2013 Dec 4.
This work presents a systematic study of population games of the Prisoner's Dilemma, Hawk-Dove, and Stag Hunt types in two-dimensional Euclidean space under two-person, one-shot game-theoretic interactions, and in the presence of agent random mobility. The goal is to investigate whether cooperation can evolve and be stable when agents can move randomly in continuous space. When the agents all have the same constant velocity cooperation may evolve if the agents update their strategies imitating the most successful neighbor. If a fitness difference proportional is used instead, cooperation does not improve with respect to the static random geometric graph case. When viscosity effects set-in and agent velocity becomes a quickly decreasing function of the number of neighbors they have, one observes the formation of monomorphic stable clusters of cooperators or defectors in the Prisoner's Dilemma. However, cooperation does not spread in the population as in the constant velocity case.
本工作对二维欧几里得空间中的二人一次性博弈论相互作用下的囚徒困境、鹰鸽博弈和猎鹿博弈的群体博弈进行了系统研究，并考虑了主体随机迁移的情况。目标是研究当主体在连续空间中可以随机移动时，合作是否可以进化并保持稳定。当所有主体都具有相同的恒定速度时，如果主体通过模仿最成功的邻居来更新策略，那么合作可能会进化。如果使用比例适应度，则合作不会相对于静态随机几何图情况得到改善。当粘性效应出现且主体速度成为其邻居数量的快速递减函数时，在囚徒困境中会观察到合作者或背叛者的单形稳定聚类的形成。然而，合作并没有像在恒定速度情况下那样在种群中传播。
