Wang Tao, Huang Keke, Wang Zhen, Zheng Xiaoping
Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China.
Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan.
PLoS One. 2015 Mar 20;10(3):e0121949. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0121949. eCollection 2015.
Up to now, there have been a great number of mechanisms to explain the individual behavior and population traits, which seem of particular significance in evolutionary biology and social behavior analysis. Among them, small groups and heterogeneity are two useful frameworks to the above issue. However, vast majority of existing works separately consider both scenarios, which is inconsistent with realistic cases in our life. Here we propose the evolutionary games of heterogeneous small groups (namely, different small groups possess different preferences to dilemma) to study the collective behavior in population evacuation. Importantly, players usually face completely different dilemmas inside and outside the small groups. By means of numerous computation simulations, it is unveiled that the ratio of players in one certain small group directly decides the final behavior of the whole population. Moreover, it can also be concluded that heterogeneous degree of preference for different small groups plays a key role in the behavior traits of the system, which may validate some realistic social observations. The proposed framework is thus universally applicable and may shed new light into the solution of social dilemmas.
到目前为止，已经有大量的机制来解释个体行为和群体特征，这在进化生物学和社会行为分析中似乎具有特别重要的意义。其中，小群体和异质性是解决上述问题的两个有用框架。然而，绝大多数现有研究分别考虑这两种情况，这与我们生活中的实际情况不符。在此，我们提出异质小群体的进化博弈（即不同的小群体对困境有不同的偏好）来研究群体疏散中的集体行为。重要的是，参与者在小群体内部和外部通常面临完全不同的困境。通过大量的计算模拟发现，某个特定小群体中参与者的比例直接决定了整个群体的最终行为。此外，还可以得出结论，不同小群体偏好的异质程度在系统的行为特征中起着关键作用，这可能验证一些现实社会观察结果。因此，所提出的框架具有普遍适用性，可能为解决社会困境提供新的思路。
