Markkula Gustav
Adaptive Systems Group, Division of Vehicle Engineering and Autonomous Systems, Department of Applied Mechanics, Chalmers University of Technology Gothenburg, Sweden.
Front Psychol. 2015 Jun 16;6:803. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00803. eCollection 2015.
Two main open questions in current consciousness research concern (i) the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and (ii) the relationship between neural activity and first-person, subjective experience. Here, possible answers are sketched for both of these, by means of a model-based analysis of what is required for one to admit having a conscious experience. To this end, a model is proposed that allows reasoning, albeit necessarily in a simplistic manner, about all of the so called "easy problems" of consciousness, from discrimination of stimuli to control of behavior and language. First, it is argued that current neuroscientific knowledge supports the view of perception and action selection as two examples of the same basic phenomenon, such that one can meaningfully refer to neuronal activations involved in perception as covert behavior. Building on existing neuroscientific and psychological models, a narrative behavior model is proposed, outlining how the brain selects covert (and sometimes overt) behaviors to construct a complex, multi-level narrative about what it is like to be the individual in question. It is hypothesized that we tend to admit a conscious experience of X if, at the time of judging consciousness, we find ourselves acceptably capable of performing narrative behavior describing X. It is argued that the proposed account reconciles seemingly conflicting empirical results, previously presented as evidence for competing theories of consciousness, and suggests that well-defined, experiment-independent NCCs are unlikely to exist. Finally, an analysis is made of what the modeled narrative behavior machinery is and is not capable of. It is discussed how an organism endowed with such a machinery could, from its first-person perspective, come to adopt notions such as "subjective experience," and of there being "hard problems," and "explanatory gaps" to be addressed in order to understand consciousness.
（i）意识的神经关联（NCC），以及（ii）神经活动与第一人称主观体验之间的关系。在此，通过基于模型的分析，勾勒出这两个问题的可能答案，该分析涉及一个人承认有意识体验所需的条件。为此，提出了一个模型，该模型允许以一种虽然必然简单的方式，对意识的所有所谓“简单问题”进行推理，从刺激的辨别到行为和语言的控制。首先，有人认为，当前的神经科学知识支持将感知和行动选择视为同一基本现象的两个例子的观点，这样一来，人们就可以有意义地将参与感知的神经元激活称为隐蔽行为。基于现有的神经科学和心理学模型，提出了一种叙事行为模型，概述了大脑如何选择隐蔽（有时是公开）行为，以构建一个关于作为相关个体是什么样的复杂、多层次叙事。假设如果在判断意识时，我们发现自己能够以可接受的能力执行描述X的叙事行为，那么我们就倾向于承认对X有有意识体验。有人认为，所提出的解释调和了以前作为意识竞争理论证据提出的看似相互矛盾的实证结果，并表明不太可能存在定义明确、与实验无关的NCC。最后，分析了所建模的叙事行为机制能够和不能够做什么。讨论了拥有这种机制的有机体如何从其第一人称视角开始采用诸如“主观体验”、存在“难题”以及存在为理解意识而有待解决的“解释鸿沟”等概念。
