Halligan Peter W, Oakley David A
School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom.
Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, United Kingdom.
Front Psychol. 2021 Apr 30;12:571460. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.571460. eCollection 2021.
Consciousness as used here, refers to the private, subjective experience of being aware of our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, actions, memories (psychological contents) including the intimate experience of a unified self with the capacity to generate and control actions and psychological contents. This compelling, intuitive consciousness-centric account has, and continues to shape folk and scientific accounts of psychology and human behavior. Over the last 30 years, research from the cognitive neurosciences has challenged this intuitive social construct account when providing a neurocognitive architecture for a human psychology. Growing evidence suggests that the executive functions typically attributed to the experience of consciousness are carried out competently, backstage and outside subjective awareness by a myriad of fast, efficient non-conscious brain systems. While it remains unclear how and where the experience of consciousness is generated in the brain, we suggested that the traditional intuitive explanation that consciousness is causally efficacious is wrong-headed when providing a cognitive neuroscientific account of human psychology. Notwithstanding the compelling 1st-person experience (inside view) that convinces us that subjective awareness is the mental curator of our actions and thoughts, we argue that the best framework for building a scientific account is to be consistent with the biophysical causal dependency of prior neural processes. From a 3rd person perspective, (outside view), we propose that subjective awareness lacking causal influence, is (no more) than our experience of being aware, our awareness of our psychological content, knowing that we are aware, and the belief that that such experiences are evidence of an agentive capacity shared by others. While the human mind can be described as comprising both conscious and nonconscious aspects, both ultimately depend on neural process in the brain. In arguing for the counter-intuitive epiphenomenal perspective, we suggest that a scientific approach considers all mental aspects of mind including consciousness in terms of their underlying, preceding (causal) biological changes, in the realization that most brain processes are not accompanied by any discernible change in subjective awareness.
这里所使用的“意识”,指的是对我们的感知、思想、情感、行动、记忆(心理内容)的私密、主观体验,包括对一个具有产生和控制行动及心理内容能力的统一自我的切身感受。这种以意识为核心、令人信服且直观的观点,已经并将继续塑造大众和科学领域对心理学及人类行为的认知。在过去30年里,认知神经科学的研究在为人类心理学提供神经认知架构时,对这种直观的社会建构观点提出了挑战。越来越多的证据表明,通常归因于意识体验的执行功能是由众多快速、高效的无意识大脑系统在后台、在主观意识之外出色地完成的。虽然目前尚不清楚意识体验在大脑中是如何产生以及产生于何处,但我们认为,在提供人类心理学的认知神经科学解释时,那种认为意识具有因果效力的传统直观解释是错误的。尽管那种令人信服的第一人称体验(内视角)使我们确信主观意识是我们行动和思想的心理管理者,但我们认为,构建科学解释的最佳框架应与先前神经过程的生物物理因果依赖性保持一致。从第三人称视角(外视角)来看,我们认为缺乏因果影响的主观意识,只不过是我们的觉知体验、对心理内容的觉知、知道自己有所觉知,以及相信这种体验是他人也具备的能动能力的证据而已。虽然人类思维可以被描述为包含有意识和无意识两个方面,但两者最终都依赖于大脑中的神经过程。在论证这种有悖直觉的副现象论观点时,我们建议科学方法应从潜在的、先前的(因果)生物变化角度来考虑思维的所有心理方面,包括意识,因为要认识到大多数大脑过程并不会伴随主观意识的任何可察觉变化。