Balwicki Łukasz, Stokłosa Michał, Balwicka-Szczyrba Małgorzata, Tomczak Wioleta
Department of Public Health and Social Medicine, Medical University of Gdansk, Gdańsk, Poland.
Economic and Health Policy Research, American Cancer Society, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.
Tob Control. 2016 Sep;25(5):521-6. doi: 10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2015-052582. Epub 2015 Sep 28.
Since 2006, when Poland ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), there have been efforts to improve tobacco control regulation in the country. At the same time, at the European Union level, Poland took part in discussions over revision of the Tobacco Tax Directive and the Tobacco Products Directive. This study aims to explore the tobacco industry's tactics to interfere with the creation of those policies.
Analysis of 257 documents obtained through freedom of information request.
We identified three means that the tobacco industry used to interfere with tobacco control policies: creating a positive attitude, expressing a will to be a part of the policymaking process, and exerting pressure. We found that those tactics have often been used unethically, with the industry providing the government with ready legislation proposals, overstating its contribution to the economy and the government revenues, misrepresenting the illicit cigarette problem and misusing scientific evidence. The industry also used legal threats, including use of bilateral trade agreements, against implementation of tobacco control measures. The companies lobbied together directly and through third parties, with the cigarette excise tax structure being the only area of disagreement among the companies. The industry also pushed the Polish government to challenge tobacco control policies in countries with stronger public policy standards, including UK display bans and the Australian plain-packaging law.
From an object of regulation, the tobacco industry in Poland became a partner with the government in legislative work. Implementation of provisions of Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC could prevent further industry interference.
自2006年波兰批准世界卫生组织《烟草控制框架公约》(FCTC)以来,该国一直在努力改善烟草控制法规。与此同时,在欧盟层面,波兰参与了关于修订《烟草税指令》和《烟草制品指令》的讨论。本研究旨在探讨烟草行业干扰这些政策制定的策略。
通过信息公开请求获取257份文件进行分析。
我们确定了烟草行业用于干扰烟草控制政策的三种手段:营造积极态度、表达参与政策制定过程的意愿以及施加压力。我们发现,这些策略的使用往往不道德,该行业向政府提供现成的立法提案,夸大其对经济和政府收入的贡献,歪曲非法卷烟问题并滥用科学证据。该行业还利用法律威胁,包括利用双边贸易协定,来反对烟草控制措施的实施。各公司直接并通过第三方联合游说,卷烟消费税结构是各公司之间唯一存在分歧的领域。该行业还推动波兰政府对公共政策标准更强的国家的烟草控制政策提出质疑,包括英国的展示禁令和澳大利亚的平装法。
从监管对象来看,波兰的烟草行业在立法工作中成为了政府的合作伙伴。实施世界卫生组织《烟草控制框架公约》第5.3条的规定可以防止该行业的进一步干扰。