Barnes Andrew Peter, Moxey Andrew Paul, Vosough Ahmadi Bouda, Borthwick Fiona Ann
Land Economy, Environment and Society Research Group, SRUC, West Mains Road, King's Buildings, EH9 3JG Edinburgh, UK.
Pareto Consulting, 29 Redford Avenue, EH13 0BX Edinburgh, UK.
Prev Vet Med. 2015 Nov 1;122(1-2):42-52. doi: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2015.09.003. Epub 2015 Sep 8.
With an increasing burden on public sector budgets, increased responsibility and cost sharing mechanisms for animal diseases are being considered. To achieve this, fiscal and non-fiscal intervention policies need to be designed such that they consistently promote positive disease risk management practices by animal keepers. This paper presents a review of the available evidence towards whether and how the level and type of funding mechanism affects change within biosecurity behaviours and the frequency of disease reporting. A Nuffield Health Ladder of Interventions approach is proposed as a way to frame the debate surrounding both current compensation mechanisms and how it is expected to change behaviour. Results of the review reveal a division between economic modelling approaches, which implicitly assume a causal link between payments and positive behaviours, and socio-geographic approaches which tend to ignore the influence of compensation mechanisms on influencing behaviours. Generally, economic studies suggest less than full compensation rates will encourage positive behaviours, but the non-economic literature indicate significant variation in response to compensation reflecting heterogeneity of livestock keepers in terms of their values, goals, risk attitudes, size of operation, animal species and production chain characteristics. This may be of encouragement to Western Governments seeking to shift cost burdens as it may induce greater targeting of non-fiscal mechanisms, or suggest more novel ways to augment current compensation mechanisms to both increase responsibility sharing and reduce this cost burden. This review suggests that a range of regulatory, fiscal and nudging policies are required to achieve socially optimal results with respect to positive behaviour change. However, the lack of directly available evidence which proves these causal links may hinder progress towards this optimal mixture of choice and non-choice based interventions.
随着公共部门预算负担的加重，人们正在考虑增加动物疾病的责任分担和成本分摊机制。要实现这一点，需要设计财政和非财政干预政策，以便始终如一地促进动物饲养者积极的疾病风险管理做法。本文综述了现有证据，以探讨资金机制的水平和类型是否以及如何影响生物安全行为的变化和疾病报告的频率。本文提出采用纳菲尔德健康干预阶梯方法，来构建围绕当前补偿机制及其预期如何改变行为的辩论。综述结果显示，经济建模方法与社会地理学方法之间存在分歧，前者隐含地假定支付与积极行为之间存在因果联系，而后者往往忽视补偿机制对行为影响的作用。总体而言，经济研究表明，低于全额补偿率会鼓励积极行为，但非经济文献表明，对补偿的反应存在显著差异，这反映了牲畜饲养者在价值观、目标、风险态度、经营规模、动物种类和生产链特征方面的异质性。这可能会鼓励西方政府寻求转移成本负担，因为这可能会促使更多地针对非财政机制，或者提出更新颖的方法来增强当前的补偿机制，以增加责任分担并减轻这种成本负担。这篇综述表明，需要一系列监管、财政和助推政策，以在积极行为改变方面取得社会最优结果。然而，缺乏直接可用的证据来证明这些因果联系，可能会阻碍朝着这种基于选择和非选择的干预措施的最优组合取得进展。
