Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam.
Cogn Sci. 2016 May;40(4):881-908. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12320. Epub 2015 Nov 2.
One of the core tenets of cognitive metaphor theory is the claim that metaphors ground abstract knowledge in concrete, first-hand experience. In this paper, I argue that this grounding hypothesis contains some problematic conceptual ambiguities and, under many reasonable interpretations, empirical difficulties. I present evidence that there are foundational obstacles to defining a coherent and cognitively valid concept of "metaphor" and "concrete meaning," and some general problems with singling out certain domains of experience as more immediate than others. I conclude from these considerations that whatever the facts are about the comprehension of individual metaphors, the available evidence is incompatible with the notion of an underlying conceptual structure organized according to the immediacy of experience.
认知隐喻理论的核心原则之一是，隐喻将抽象知识建立在具体的第一手经验之上。在本文中，我认为这个基础假设包含了一些有问题的概念上的模糊性，并且在许多合理的解释下，还存在经验上的困难。我提出了证据表明，定义一个连贯的和认知有效的“隐喻”和“具体意义”的概念存在基础障碍，并且将某些经验领域视为比其他领域更直接也存在一些一般性问题。基于这些考虑，我得出结论，无论关于个体隐喻的理解的事实是什么，现有证据都与根据经验的直接性组织的底层概念结构的概念不一致。
