Quiñones Andrés E, van Doorn G Sander, Pen Ido, Weissing Franz J, Taborsky Michael
Theoretical Research in Evolutionary Life Sciences, Groningen Institute for Evolutionary Life Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen 9747 AG, The Netherlands Department of Behavioural Ecology, Institute of Ecology and Evolution, University of Bern, 3032 Hinterkappelen, Switzerland
Theoretical Research in Evolutionary Life Sciences, Groningen Institute for Evolutionary Life Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen 9747 AG, The Netherlands.
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2016 Feb 5;371(1687):20150089. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2015.0089.
Two alternative frameworks explain the evolution of cooperation in the face of conflicting interests. Conflicts can be alleviated by kinship, the alignment of interests by virtue of shared genes, or by negotiation strategies, allowing mutually beneficial trading of services or commodities. Although negotiation often occurs in kin-structured populations, the interplay of kin- and negotiation-based mechanisms in the evolution of cooperation remains an unresolved issue. Inspired by the biology of a cooperatively breeding fish, we developed an individual-based simulation model to study the evolution of negotiation-based cooperation in relation to different levels of genetic relatedness. We show that the evolution of negotiation strategies leads to an equilibrium where subordinates appease dominants by conditional cooperation, resulting in high levels of help and low levels of aggression. This negotiation-based equilibrium can be reached both in the absence of relatedness and in a kin-structured population. However, when relatedness is high, evolution often ends up in an alternative equilibrium where subordinates help their kin unconditionally. The level of help at this kin-selected equilibrium is considerably lower than at the negotiation-based equilibrium, and it corresponds to a level reached when responsiveness is prevented from evolving in the simulations. A mathematical invasion analysis reveals that, quite generally, the alignment of payoffs due to the relatedness of interaction partners tends to impede selection for harsh but effective punishment of defectors. Hence kin structure will often hamper rather than facilitate the evolution of productive cooperation.
两种不同的框架解释了在利益冲突情况下合作行为的演变。亲属关系可以缓解冲突，即凭借共享基因实现利益一致，或者通过谈判策略，允许对服务或商品进行互利交易。尽管谈判常常发生在亲属结构的群体中，但亲属关系和基于谈判的机制在合作演变过程中的相互作用仍是一个尚未解决的问题。受一种合作繁殖鱼类生物学特性的启发，我们开发了一个基于个体的模拟模型，以研究基于谈判的合作在不同遗传相关性水平下的演变。我们发现，谈判策略的演变会导致一种均衡状态，即下属通过有条件合作安抚上级，从而实现高水平的帮助行为和低水平的攻击行为。无论是否存在亲属关系，在亲属结构的群体中都能达到这种基于谈判的均衡状态。然而，当亲属关系紧密时，进化往往会导致另一种均衡状态，即下属无条件地帮助其亲属。在这种亲属选择的均衡状态下，帮助行为的水平远低于基于谈判的均衡状态，并且与模拟中阻止反应性进化时所达到的水平相当。一项数学入侵分析表明，一般来说，由于互动伙伴的亲属关系导致的收益一致性往往会阻碍对叛逃者进行严厉但有效的惩罚的选择。因此，亲属结构往往会阻碍而非促进高效合作行为的进化。
