Yang Wei
Centre for Health Services Studies,Personal Social Services Research Unit,George Allen Wing,University of Kent,Canterbury,UK.
Health Econ Policy Law. 2016 Oct;11(4):379-95. doi: 10.1017/S1744133116000086. Epub 2016 Feb 26.
Over-prescription has become one major problem in China's health care sector. Incorporating interview data from hospitals in Shanghai, this paper provided empirical evidence on how the process of over-prescription was carried out in day-to-day clinical settings, and demonstrates various mechanisms that allow over-prescription to continue vigorously in the context of the Chinese health care system. In particular, this study identified four levels of incentives that over-prescription was carried out: hospital, medical department, doctors and pharmaceutical companies. Due to the insufficient funding from the government and rising operational costs, hospitals had to rely on the sales of drugs and provision of medical services to survive. This funding pressure then transferred to specific revenue targets for medical departments. A combination of incentives, including drug remunerations, bonus system, low pay and high workloads motivated over-prescription at doctor level. At pharmaceutical company level, high profits of pharmaceuticals products as well as lack of emphasis on efficacy of drugs led to under-table payments and illicit drug remunerations. The study argued that the way that the Chinese health care system operates was based on the profit-seeking principle rather than on fulfilling its social functions, and called for a systematic reform of provider incentives to eradicating the problem of over-prescription.
过度开药已成为中国医疗保健领域的一个主要问题。本文结合来自上海医院的访谈数据,提供了关于过度开药在日常临床环境中是如何发生的实证证据,并展示了在中国医疗保健系统背景下使过度开药持续盛行的各种机制。具体而言,本研究确定了过度开药发生的四个激励层面:医院、科室、医生和制药公司。由于政府资金不足以及运营成本上升,医院不得不依靠药品销售和医疗服务提供来维持运营。这种资金压力随后转嫁到科室的具体收入目标上。包括药品回扣、奖金制度、低薪酬和高工作量在内的多种激励措施共同促使医生层面出现过度开药现象。在制药公司层面,药品的高利润以及对药品疗效缺乏重视导致了回扣和非法药品报酬。该研究认为,中国医疗保健系统的运作方式基于逐利原则而非履行其社会职能,并呼吁对提供者激励机制进行系统性改革以根除过度开药问题。