Haigh Matthew, Dodd Alyson L
Department of Psychology, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK.
Spectrum Centre for Mental Health Research, Division of Health Research, Lancaster University, UK.
Psychol Psychother. 2017 Mar;90(1):70-83. doi: 10.1111/papt.12096. Epub 2016 May 30.
An Integrative Cognitive Model of mood swings and bipolar disorder proposes that cognitive styles characterized by extreme self-referent appraisals of internal states (e.g., 'If I have a bad night's sleep it means that I am about to have a breakdown') interfere with mood regulation. The aim of this study is to determine whether strong endorsement of such appraisals is predicted by a diminished ability to access disconfirming counterexamples.
We examined whether the ability to access two different categories of counterexample (known as Disabling Conditions and Alternative Causes) would predict endorsement of extreme appraisals (measured by the Hypomanic Attitudes and Positive Predictions Inventory; HAPPI) and mania risk (measured by the Hypomanic Personality Scale; HPS).
A non-clinical sample of 150 students completed the HAPPI, the HPS and a conditional reasoning task that indexed the ability to access Disabling Conditions and Alternative Causes. Current mood was controlled for using the Internal States Scale.
The ability to make use of disabling counterexamples during the reasoning task was inversely related with scores on the HAPPI (r = -.19, p < .05); participants that were less able to make use of disabling counterexamples endorsed extreme self-referent appraisals to a greater extent. There was no association between the use of alternative cause counterexamples and the HAPPI, and no association between either measure of counterexample generation and the HPS.
A diminished ability to use disconfirming evidence when reasoning about the world may reinforce problematic cognitive styles such as extreme, personalized appraisals of experience, which can interfere with mood regulation.
Problematic cognitive styles such as extreme, personalized appraisals of experience may be reinforced by the inability to produce or access evidence that disconfirms these maladaptive beliefs. This reasoning bias may be associated with cognitive styles underlying psychopathology. There may be clinical utility in exploring the use of disabler generation in psychological interventions, to help disconfirm maladaptive beliefs.
情绪波动与双相情感障碍的综合认知模型提出，以对内部状态进行极端自我参照评估为特征的认知风格（例如，“如果我一晚睡眠不好，就意味着我即将精神崩溃”）会干扰情绪调节。本研究的目的是确定获取反例以证伪的能力下降是否预示着对这类评估的强烈认同。
我们研究了获取两类不同反例（即失效条件和替代原因）的能力是否能预测对极端评估的认同（通过轻躁狂态度与积极预测量表；HAPPI进行测量）以及躁狂风险（通过轻躁狂人格量表；HPS进行测量）。
150名学生的非临床样本完成了HAPPI、HPS以及一项条件推理任务，该任务用于衡量获取失效条件和替代原因的能力。使用内部状态量表对当前情绪进行了控制。
在推理任务中利用失效反例的能力与HAPPI得分呈负相关（r = -0.19，p < 0.05）；利用失效反例能力较弱的参与者在更大程度上认同极端的自我参照评估。使用替代原因反例与HAPPI之间没有关联，反例生成的任何一项测量与HPS之间也没有关联。
在对世界进行推理时，使用反证的能力下降可能会强化有问题的认知风格，比如对经历进行极端的、个性化的评估，这可能会干扰情绪调节。
诸如对经历进行极端的、个性化的评估等有问题的认知风格，可能会因无法产生或获取能够证伪这些适应不良信念的证据而得到强化。这种推理偏差可能与精神病理学潜在的认知风格相关。在心理干预中探索使用生成失效条件的方法可能具有临床效用，以帮助证伪适应不良信念。
