Buskens Vincent, Snijders Chris
Department of Sociology/ICS, Utrecht University, Padualaan 14, 3584 CH Utrecht, The Netherlands.
Human Technology Interaction Group, Eindhoven University of Technology, PO Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands.
Dyn Games Appl. 2016;6(4):477-494. doi: 10.1007/s13235-015-0144-4. Epub 2015 Feb 24.
We study how payoffs and network structure affect reaching the payoff-dominant equilibrium in a [Formula: see text] coordination game that actors play with their neighbors in a network. Using an extensive simulation analysis of over 100,000 networks with 2-25 actors, we show that the importance of network characteristics is restricted to a limited part of the payoff space. In this part, we conclude that the payoff-dominant equilibrium is chosen more often if network density is larger, the network is more centralized, and segmentation of the network is smaller. Moreover, it is more likely that heterogeneity in behavior persists if the network is more segmented and less centralized. Persistence of heterogeneous behavior is not related to network density.
我们研究了在参与者与网络中的邻居进行的[公式:见原文]协调博弈中,收益和网络结构如何影响达到收益主导均衡。通过对超过100,000个包含2至25个参与者的网络进行广泛的模拟分析,我们表明网络特征的重要性仅限于收益空间的有限部分。在这一部分中,我们得出结论:如果网络密度更大、网络更集中且网络的分割程度更小,那么收益主导均衡被选择的频率更高。此外,如果网络分割程度更高且集中程度更低,行为异质性持续存在的可能性更大。异质行为的持续存在与网络密度无关。