Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2017 Oct 3;114(40):10791-10796. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1711383114. Epub 2017 Sep 18.
The timing of thoughts and perceptions plays an essential role in belief formation. Just as people can experience in-the-moment perceptual illusions, however, they can also be deceived about how events unfold in time. Here, we consider how a particular type of temporal distortion, in which the apparent future influences "earlier" events in conscious awareness, might affect people's most fundamental beliefs about themselves and the world. Making use of a task that has been shown to elicit such reversals in the temporal experience of prediction and observation, we find that people who are more prone to think that they predicted an event that they actually already observed are also more likely to report holding delusion-like beliefs. Moreover, this relationship appears to be specific to how people experience prediction and is not explained by domain-general deficits in temporal discrimination. These findings may help uncover low-level perceptual mechanisms underlying delusional belief or schizotypy more broadly and may ultimately prove useful as a tool for identifying those at risk for psychotic illness.
思维和感知的时间顺序在信念形成中起着至关重要的作用。然而,就像人们可以体验即时的感知错觉一样,他们也可能会被欺骗,误以为事件是按照时间顺序展开的。在这里,我们考虑了一种特殊类型的时间扭曲,即看似未来的事件会影响到意识中“更早”的事件,这种扭曲可能会如何影响人们对自己和世界的最基本信念。我们利用一种已经被证明可以在预测和观察的时间体验中引起这种反转的任务,发现那些更倾向于认为自己预测了一个实际上已经观察到的事件的人,也更有可能报告持有类似妄想的信念。此外,这种关系似乎是特定于人们如何体验预测的,而不能用时间辨别方面的一般性缺陷来解释。这些发现可能有助于揭示更广泛的妄想信念或精神分裂症的低水平感知机制,并最终可能作为识别精神病风险人群的工具证明是有用的。