Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
Cardiff University Brain Research Imaging Centre (CUBRIC), School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, UK.
Schizophr Bull. 2018 Oct 17;44(6):1245-1253. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbx177.
Psychotic phenomena manifest in healthy and clinical populations as complex patterns of aberrant perceptions (hallucinations) and tenacious, irrational beliefs ( delusions). According to predictive processing accounts, hallucinations and delusions arise from atypicalities in the integration of prior knowledge with incoming sensory information. However, the computational details of these atypicalities and their specific phenomenological manifestations are not well characterized. We tested the hypothesis that hallucination-proneness arises from increased reliance on overly general application of prior knowledge in perceptual inference, generating percepts that readily capture the gist of the environment but inaccurately render its details. We separately probed the use of prior knowledge to perceive the gist vs the details of ambiguous images in a healthy population with varying degrees of hallucination- and delusion-proneness. We found that the use of prior knowledge varied with psychotic phenomena and their composition in terms of aberrant percepts vs aberrant beliefs. Consistent with previous findings, hallucination-proneness conferred an advantage using prior knowledge to perceive image gist but, contrary to predictions, did not confer disadvantage perceiving image details. Predominant hallucination-proneness actually conferred advantages perceiving both image gist and details, consistent with reliance on highly detailed perceptual knowledge. Delusion-proneness, and especially predominance of delusion-proneness over hallucination-proneness, conferred disadvantage perceiving image details but not image gist, though evidence of specific impairment of detail perception was preliminary. We suggest this is consistent with reliance on abstract, belief-like knowledge. We posit that phenomenological variability in psychotic experiences may be driven by variability in the type of knowledge observers rely upon to resolve perceptual ambiguity.
精神现象在健康人群和临床人群中表现为异常感知(幻觉)和固执、非理性信念(妄想)的复杂模式。根据预测加工理论,幻觉和妄想是由于先前知识与传入感觉信息的整合中出现异常所致。然而,这些异常的计算细节及其特定的现象学表现尚不清楚。我们检验了这样一个假设,即易产生幻觉的人倾向于过度依赖先前知识的过度泛化来进行感知推断,从而产生容易捕捉环境要点但不准确地呈现其细节的感知。我们分别探测了具有不同程度的幻觉和妄想倾向的健康人群在感知模糊图像的要点和细节时,先前知识的使用情况。我们发现,先前知识的使用取决于精神现象及其异常感知与异常信念的组成。与先前的发现一致,易产生幻觉的人在使用先前知识感知图像要点时具有优势,但与预测相反,在感知图像细节时则没有优势。主要的幻觉倾向实际上在感知图像要点和细节时都具有优势,这与依赖高度详细的感知知识一致。易产生妄想的人,尤其是易产生妄想的人比易产生幻觉的人,在感知图像细节方面处于劣势,但感知图像要点不受影响,尽管对细节感知的具体损害的证据还不充分。我们认为这与依赖抽象的、类似信念的知识一致。我们假设,精神体验的现象学变异性可能是由观察者依赖的知识类型的变异性所驱动的。