University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts (E.T.R.).
Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts (A.M.Z.).
Ann Intern Med. 2018 Feb 20;168(4):255-265. doi: 10.7326/M17-1740. Epub 2018 Nov 28.
When risk adjustment is inadequate and incentives are weak, pay-for-performance programs, such as the Value-Based Payment Modifier (Value Modifier [VM]) implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, may contribute to health care disparities without improving performance on average.
To estimate the association between VM exposure and performance on quality and spending measures and to assess the effects of adjusting for additional patient characteristics on performance differences between practices serving higher-risk and those serving lower-risk patients.
Exploiting the phase-in of the VM on the basis of practice size, regression discontinuity analysis and 2014 Medicare claims were used to estimate differences in practice performance associated with exposure of practices with 100 or more clinicians to full VM incentives (bonuses and penalties) and exposure of practices with 10 or more clinicians to partial incentives (bonuses only). Analyses were repeated with 2015 claims to estimate performance differences associated with a second year of exposure above the threshold of 100 or more clinicians. Performance differences were assessed between practices serving higher- and those serving lower-risk patients after standard Medicare adjustments versus adjustment for additional patient characteristics.
Fee-for-service Medicare.
Random 20% sample of beneficiaries.
Hospitalization for ambulatory care-sensitive conditions, all-cause 30-day readmissions, Medicare spending, and mortality.
No statistically significant discontinuities were found at the threshold of 10 or more or 100 or more clinicians in the relationship between practice size and performance on quality or spending measures in either year. Adjustment for additional patient characteristics narrowed performance differences by 9.2% to 67.9% between practices in the highest and those in the lowest quartile of Medicaid patients and Hierarchical Condition Category scores.
Observational design and administrative data.
The VM was not associated with differences in performance on program measures. Performance differences between practices serving higher- and those serving lower-risk patients were affected considerably by additional adjustments, suggesting a potential for Medicare's pay-for-performance programs to exacerbate health care disparities.
The Laura and John Arnold Foundation and National Institute on Aging.
当风险调整不充分且激励措施薄弱时,按绩效付费计划(例如医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心实施的基于价值的支付调整)可能会导致医疗保健差距扩大,而不会平均提高绩效。
估计 VM 暴露与质量和支出措施绩效之间的关联,并评估针对服务高风险和低风险患者的实践之间的绩效差异,调整其他患者特征的影响。
利用 VM 根据实践规模分阶段实施,回归不连续性分析和 2014 年医疗保险索赔数据,估计与 100 名或更多临床医生的实践完全暴露于 VM 激励措施(奖金和罚款)和 10 名或更多临床医生暴露于部分激励措施(仅奖金)相关的实践绩效差异。使用 2015 年的索赔数据重复分析,以估计超过 100 名或更多临床医生门槛的第二年暴露相关的绩效差异。在标准医疗保险调整后与调整其他患者特征后,评估服务高风险和低风险患者的实践之间的绩效差异。
按服务收费的医疗保险。
随机抽取的 20%的受益人。
门诊保健敏感条件的住院治疗、全因 30 天再入院、医疗保险支出和死亡率。
在 2014 年和 2015 年,在实践规模与质量或支出措施绩效之间的关系中,没有发现 10 名或更多或 100 名或更多临床医生的门槛存在统计学显著不连续性。调整其他患者特征将最高和最低 Medicaid 患者和等级条件类别分数四分位数的实践之间的绩效差异缩小了 9.2%至 67.9%。
观察性设计和行政数据。
VM 与计划措施的绩效差异无关。服务高风险和低风险患者的实践之间的绩效差异受到其他调整的很大影响,这表明医疗保险按绩效付费计划有可能加剧医疗保健差距。
劳拉和约翰·阿诺德基金会和国家老龄化研究所。