Karen E. Joynt Maddox (
Arnold M. Epstein is the John H. Foster Professor of Health Policy and Management at the Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, in Boston, Massachusetts.
Health Aff (Millwood). 2017 Dec;36(12):2175-2184. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2017.0894.
In 2015 Medicare launched the Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier program, the largest US ambulatory care pay-for-performance program to date and a precursor to the forthcoming Merit-based Incentive Payment System. In its first year, the program included practices with a hundred or more clinicians. We found that 1,010 practices met this criterion, 899 of which had at least one attributed beneficiary. Of these latter practices, 263 (29.3 percent) failed to report performance data and received a 1 percent reporting-based penalty. Of the 636 practices that reported performance data, those that elected quality tiering-voluntarily receiving performance-based penalties or bonuses-and those with high use of electronic health records had better performance on quality and costs than other practices. Practices with a primary care focus had better quality than other practices but similar costs. These findings translated into differences in the receipt of penalties and bonuses and may have implications for performance patterns under the Merit-based Incentive Payment System.
2015 年,医疗保险推出了医师基于价值的支付调整计划,这是迄今为止美国最大的门诊医疗支付绩效计划,也是即将推出的基于绩效的奖励支付系统的前身。在该计划的第一年,有一百名或更多临床医生的实践参与其中。我们发现,有 1010 个实践符合这一标准,其中 899 个实践至少有一个归因受益人。在这些实践中,有 263 个(29.3%)未报告绩效数据,并因此受到 1%的基于报告的罚款。在报告绩效数据的 636 个实践中,那些选择质量分层的实践——自愿接受基于绩效的罚款或奖金——以及那些电子健康记录使用率高的实践,在质量和成本方面的表现要好于其他实践。以初级保健为重点的实践在质量方面要好于其他实践,但成本相似。这些发现转化为奖惩的差异,可能对基于绩效的奖励支付系统下的绩效模式产生影响。