Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA; Laboratory for Human Systems Neuroscience, RIKEN Brain Science Institute, Wako-shi, Saitama 351-0198, Japan.
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA; Laboratory for Human Systems Neuroscience, RIKEN Brain Science Institute, Wako-shi, Saitama 351-0198, Japan.
Neuron. 2018 Jan 17;97(2):462-474.e6. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2017.12.011. Epub 2017 Dec 28.
Human perceptual inference has been fruitfully characterized as a normative Bayesian process in which sensory evidence and priors are multiplicatively combined to form posteriors from which sensory estimates can be optimally read out. We tested whether this basic Bayesian framework could explain human subjects' behavior in two estimation tasks in which we varied the strength of sensory evidence (motion coherence or contrast) and priors (set of directions or orientations). We found that despite excellent agreement of estimates mean and variability with a Basic Bayesian observer model, the estimate distributions were bimodal with unpredicted modes near the prior and the likelihood. We developed a model that switched between prior and sensory evidence rather than integrating the two, which better explained the data than the Basic and several other Bayesian observers. Our data suggest that humans can approximate Bayesian optimality with a switching heuristic that forgoes multiplicative combination of priors and likelihoods.
人类感知推断可以被有效地描述为一种规范的贝叶斯过程,在这个过程中,感官证据和先验概率被相乘组合,形成可以从后验概率中最佳读取的感官估计值。我们测试了这个基本的贝叶斯框架是否可以解释人类在两个估计任务中的行为,在这两个任务中,我们改变了感官证据(运动一致性或对比度)和先验概率(方向或方向集合)的强度。我们发现,尽管估计的平均值和变异性与基本贝叶斯观测器模型非常吻合,但估计分布呈双峰分布,模式不规律,在先验概率和似然概率附近。我们开发了一种在先验概率和感官证据之间切换而不是整合两者的模型,该模型比基本模型和其他几个贝叶斯观测器更好地解释了数据。我们的数据表明,人类可以通过一种切换启发式方法来近似贝叶斯最优性,这种方法放弃了先验概率和似然概率的乘法组合。