Feyaerts Jasper, Vanheule Stijn
Department of Psychoanalysis and Clinical Consulting, University of Ghent, Ghent, Belgium.
Front Psychol. 2017 Dec 12;8:2162. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02162. eCollection 2017.
In the present essay, we aim to develop an expressivist reading of the phenomenon of first-person authority and the adverbial meaning of unconsciousness. In the first part, Wittgenstein's grammatical remarks on the asymmetry between the first -and third-persons in psychological self-ascriptions are developed as an alternative to detectivist explanations according to which first-person authority is to be regarded as a matter of epistemic accomplishment. In the second part, this expressivist account will be used to propose a non-epistemic analysis of the meaning of unconsciousness and to offer a critical discussion of both Freud's and Lacan's respective readings of the unconscious. Regarding the latter, we will reject the idea that the concept of the unconscious (i) necessitates the introduction of a (Cartesian) "subject of the unconscious" and (ii) could be deduced from the paradoxes of first-personal reference.
在本文中，我们旨在对第一人称权威现象和无意识的状语意义进行一种表现主义解读。在第一部分，维特根斯坦关于心理自我归因中第一人称与第三人称不对称性的语法评论得以展开，以此作为对检测主义解释的一种替代。检测主义解释认为第一人称权威应被视为一种认知成就问题。在第二部分，这种表现主义解释将被用于对无意识的意义提出一种非认知性分析，并对弗洛伊德和拉康各自对无意识的解读进行批判性讨论。关于后者，我们将拒绝这样的观点，即无意识概念（i）必然需要引入一个（笛卡尔式的）“无意识主体”，以及（ii）可以从第一人称指称的悖论中推导出来。
