Dizon-Ross Rebecca, Dupas Pascaline, Robinson Jonathan
Booth School of Business, University of Chicago.
Department of Economics, Stanford University, and NBER.
J Public Econ. 2017 Dec;156:150-169. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.09.005. Epub 2017 Sep 28.
Distributing subsidized health products through existing health infrastructure could substantially and cost-effectively improve health in sub-Saharan Africa. There is, however, widespread concern that poor governance - in particular, limited health worker accountability - seriously undermines the effectiveness of subsidy programs. We audit targeted bednet distribution programs to quantify the extent of agency problems. We find that around 80% of the eligible receive the subsidy as intended, and up to 15% of subsidies are leaked to ineligible people. Supplementing the program with simple financial or monitoring incentives for health workers does not improve performance further and is thus not cost-effective in this context.
通过现有的卫生基础设施分发补贴的卫生产品,可以在撒哈拉以南非洲大幅且经济高效地改善健康状况。然而,人们普遍担心治理不善——尤其是卫生工作者问责制有限——会严重削弱补贴计划的有效性。我们对有针对性的蚊帐分发计划进行审计,以量化代理问题的程度。我们发现,约80%符合条件的人按预期获得了补贴,高达15%的补贴流向了不符合条件的人。在此背景下,为卫生工作者提供简单的财务或监督激励措施来补充该计划,并不能进一步提高绩效,因此不具有成本效益。