Department of Psychology and Center for Brain Science, Harvard University, 52 Oxford St., Room 295.05, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA.
Psychon Bull Rev. 2019 Feb;26(1):13-28. doi: 10.3758/s13423-018-1488-8.
Human beliefs have remarkable robustness in the face of disconfirmation. This robustness is often explained as the product of heuristics or motivated reasoning. However, robustness can also arise from purely rational principles when the reasoner has recourse to ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses. Auxiliary hypotheses primarily function as the linking assumptions connecting different beliefs to one another and to observational data, but they can also function as a "protective belt" that explains away disconfirmation by absorbing some of the blame. The present article traces the role of auxiliary hypotheses from philosophy of science to Bayesian models of cognition and a host of behavioral phenomena, demonstrating their wide-ranging implications.
人类的信念在面对证伪时具有很强的稳健性。这种稳健性通常被解释为启发式或动机推理的产物。然而，当推理者诉诸特设辅助假设时，稳健性也可能源于纯粹的理性原则。辅助假设主要作为将不同信念彼此以及与观测数据联系起来的连接假设起作用，但它们也可以作为“保护带”，通过吸收部分责任来解释证伪。本文从科学哲学追溯辅助假设的作用到认知的贝叶斯模型和一系列行为现象，展示了它们广泛的影响。
