Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, London WC1E 7HU, UK
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6GG, UK.
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2018 Aug 5;373(1752). doi: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0133.
The problem of how concepts can refer to or be about the non-mental world is particularly puzzling for abstract concepts. There is growing evidence that many characteristics beyond the perceptual are involved in grounding different kinds of abstract concept. A resource that has been suggested, but little explored, is introspection. This paper develops that suggestion by focusing specifically on metacognition-on the thoughts and feelings that thinkers have about a concept. One example of metacognition about concepts is the judgement that we should defer to others in how a given concept is used. Another example is our internal assessment of which concepts are dependable and useful, and which less so. Metacognition of this kind may be especially important for grounding abstract concepts.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.
概念如何能够指代或涉及非心理世界的问题，特别是对于抽象概念来说，特别令人困惑。越来越多的证据表明，在不同种类的抽象概念的基础中，除了感知之外，还有许多其他特征。有一种资源被提出，但很少被探索，那就是内省。本文通过特别关注元认知——即思考者对某个概念的想法和感受，进一步发展了这一观点。元认知的一个例子是这样的判断，即我们应该在如何使用某个特定概念上听从他人的意见。另一个例子是我们对哪些概念是可靠和有用的，以及哪些概念不太可靠和有用的内部评估。这种元认知对于抽象概念的基础可能特别重要。本文是“大脑中抽象概念的多样性：发展、使用和表现”这一主题的一部分。
