Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 10099 Berlin, Germany.
Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY 10016, USA
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2018 Aug 5;373(1752). doi: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0142.
Evaluative concepts qualify as abstract because they seem to go beyond what is given in experience. This is especially clear in the case of moral concepts. Justice, for example, has no fixed appearance. Less obviously, aesthetic concepts may also qualify as abstract. The very same sensory input can be regarded as beautiful by one person and ugly by another. Artistic success can also transcend sensory accessible features. Here, we focus on moral badness and aesthetic goodness and argue that both can be grounded in emotional responses. Emotions, in turn, are grounded in bodily perceptions, which correspond to action tendencies. When we conceptualize something as good or bad (whether in the moral or aesthetic domain), we experience our bodily responses to that thing. The moral and aesthetic domains are distinguished by the emotions that they involve.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.
评价性概念是抽象的，因为它们似乎超越了经验所给予的东西。在道德概念的情况下尤其如此。例如，正义没有固定的外观。不太明显的是，审美概念也可能是抽象的。同一个感官输入可以被一个人认为是美丽的，而被另一个人认为是丑陋的。艺术的成功也可以超越感官可及的特征。在这里，我们关注道德上的邪恶和审美上的美好，并认为两者都可以建立在情感反应的基础上。情感反过来又建立在与行动倾向相对应的身体感知上。当我们将某事物概念化为好或坏（无论是在道德还是审美领域）时，我们会体验到我们对该事物的身体反应。道德和审美领域是由它们所涉及的情感来区分的。本文是“大脑中的各种抽象概念：发展、使用和表现”主题特刊的一部分。
