Pölzler Thomas
Institute of Philosophy, University of Graz, Graz, Austria.
Rev Philos Psychol. 2018;9(3):647-670. doi: 10.1007/s13164-018-0401-8. Epub 2018 Jun 1.
In recent years an increasing number of psychologists have begun to explore the prevalence, causes and effects of ordinary people's intuitions about moral realism. Many of these studies have lacked in construct validity, i.e., they have failed to (fully or exclusively) measure moral realism. My aim in this paper accordingly is to motivate and guide methodological improvements. In analysis of prominent existing measures, I develop general recommendations for overcoming ten serious worries about research on folk moral realism. G1 and G2 require studies' answer choices to be as metaethically comprehensive as methodologically feasible. G3 and G4 prevent fallacious inferences from intuitions about related debates. G5 and G6 limit first-order moral and epistemic influences. G7 address studies' instructions. And G8 and G9 suggest tests of important psychological presuppositions.
近年来，越来越多的心理学家开始探究普通人对道德实在论的直觉的普遍性、成因及影响。这些研究中有许多缺乏建构效度，也就是说，它们未能（完全或专门）衡量道德实在论。因此，本文的目的是推动并指导方法上的改进。在分析现有的重要测量方法时，我针对民间道德实在论研究中十个严重问题提出了一般性建议。G1和G2要求研究的答案选项在方法可行的情况下尽可能在元伦理学上具有全面性。G3和G4防止从关于相关辩论的直觉中得出错误推论。G5和G6限制一阶道德和认知影响。G7涉及研究的说明。G8和G9建议对重要的心理学预设进行检验。
