Colaço David
University of Pittsburgh, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, 4200 Fifth Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15260, United States.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2018 Dec;72:32-40. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.04.003. Epub 2018 May 17.
In this paper, I investigate the nature of empirical findings that provide evidence for the characterization of a scientific phenomenon, and the defeasible nature of this evidence. To do so, I explore an exemplary instance of the rejection of a characterization of a scientific phenomenon: memory transfer. I examine the reason why the characterization of memory transfer was rejected, and analyze how this rejection tied to researchers' failures to resolve experimental issues relating to replication and confounds. I criticize the presentation of the case by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, who claim that no sufficient reason was provided to abandon research on memory transfer. I argue that skeptics about memory transfer adopted what I call a defeater strategy, in which researchers exploit the defeasibility of the evidence for a characterization of a phenomenon.
在本文中，我研究了为科学现象的特征描述提供证据的实证发现的本质，以及该证据的可废止性。为此，我探讨了一个拒绝科学现象特征描述的典型例子：记忆转移。我研究了记忆转移的特征描述被拒绝的原因，并分析了这种拒绝如何与研究人员未能解决与复制和混淆相关的实验问题联系在一起。我批评了哈里·柯林斯和特雷弗·平奇对该案例的描述，他们声称没有给出放弃记忆转移研究的充分理由。我认为，对记忆转移持怀疑态度的人采用了我所称的反驳策略，即研究人员利用支持现象特征描述的证据的可废止性。
