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了解过去有助于未来的合作。

Knowing the past improves cooperation in the future.

机构信息

Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525, Budapest, Hungary.

Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000, Maribor, Slovenia.

出版信息

Sci Rep. 2019 Jan 22;9(1):262. doi: 10.1038/s41598-018-36486-x.

DOI:10.1038/s41598-018-36486-x
PMID:30670732
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6342912/
Abstract

Cooperation is the cornerstone of human evolutionary success. Like no other species, we champion the sacrifice of personal benefits for the common good, and we work together to achieve what we are unable to achieve alone. Knowledge and information from past generations is thereby often instrumental in ensuring we keep cooperating rather than deteriorating to less productive ways of coexistence. Here we present a mathematical model based on evolutionary game theory that shows how using the past as the benchmark for evolutionary success, rather than just current performance, significantly improves cooperation in the future. Interestingly, the details of just how the past is taken into account play only second-order importance, whether it be a weighted average of past payoffs or just a single payoff value from the past. Cooperation is promoted because information from the past disables fast invasions of defectors, thus enhancing the long-term benefits of cooperative behavior.

摘要

合作是人类进化成功的基石。与其他物种不同,我们倡导牺牲个人利益以追求共同利益,我们共同努力实现个人无法独自完成的目标。因此,过去几代人的知识和信息常常有助于确保我们继续合作,而不是退化为生产力更低的共存方式。在这里,我们提出了一个基于进化博弈论的数学模型,该模型表明,如何将过去作为进化成功的基准,而不仅仅是当前表现,将显著提高未来的合作。有趣的是,过去是如何被考虑的细节只具有二阶重要性,无论是过去收益的加权平均值还是过去的单个收益值。合作得到促进是因为过去的信息阻止了破坏者的快速入侵,从而增强了合作行为的长期利益。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/beb83190137a/41598_2018_36486_Fig6_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/9dfd9cb9eb15/41598_2018_36486_Fig1_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/f63558d78659/41598_2018_36486_Fig2_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/488bfcb84ecf/41598_2018_36486_Fig3_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/43930a8aa908/41598_2018_36486_Fig4_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/8b8d8cc01048/41598_2018_36486_Fig5_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/beb83190137a/41598_2018_36486_Fig6_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/9dfd9cb9eb15/41598_2018_36486_Fig1_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/f63558d78659/41598_2018_36486_Fig2_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/488bfcb84ecf/41598_2018_36486_Fig3_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/43930a8aa908/41598_2018_36486_Fig4_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/8b8d8cc01048/41598_2018_36486_Fig5_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/265b/6342912/beb83190137a/41598_2018_36486_Fig6_HTML.jpg

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