Austin Louise V
Centre for Health, Law, and Society, University of Bristol School of Law, Bristol, UK.
Med Law Rev. 2019 May 1;27(2):339-351. doi: 10.1093/medlaw/fwy044.
In Hii Chii Kok v (1) Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien; (2) National Cancer Centre, the Singapore Court of Appeal followed the approach of other Commonwealth jurisdictions by rejecting the application of Bolam as the standard of disclosure in claims concerning informed consent to medical treatment. Instead, the court employed a modified version of the standard of disclosure adopted in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board. While broadly welcomed, Montgomery has been criticised for its lack of clarity on the application of some elements of its disclosure standard. In particular, questions remain as to: what factors should be taken into account within the reasonable and particular patient limbs of the test of materiality; how will the 'reasonableness' of alternative treatments be determined; and what is the scope of the therapeutic exception. This case commentary explores how Hii's analysis of the modified standard offers insights into how those elements of Montgomery could be interpreted in the future.
在“希奇·科克诉（1）黄炳金·伦敦·吕西安；（2）国家癌症中心”一案中，新加坡上诉法院遵循了其他英联邦司法管辖区的做法，拒绝将博勒姆标准作为医疗治疗知情同意权索赔中的披露标准。相反，法院采用了蒙哥马利诉拉纳克郡卫生委员会案中所采用的披露标准的修订版本。尽管蒙哥马利案受到广泛欢迎，但也有人批评其在披露标准的某些要素应用上不够清晰。具体而言，仍存在以下问题：在实质性检验的合理且特定患者部分应考虑哪些因素；如何确定替代治疗的“合理性”；以及治疗例外的范围是什么。本案例评论探讨了希奇对修订标准的分析如何为未来解释蒙哥马利案的这些要素提供见解。
