Slors Marc
Section Philosophy of Mind and Language, Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands.
Front Psychol. 2019 Mar 26;10:552. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00552. eCollection 2019.
Research initiated by Benjamin Libet suggests that short-term conscious intentions are not the onsets of bodily actions. However, other research, particularly on longer-term intentions, seems to show that at least some conscious intentions are effective. This leads to the idea that volition is a complex interplay between conscious and unconscious processes. The nature and structure of this interplay is mostly uncharted territory. In this article, I will highlight two currently neglected distinctions that will help to chart the territory. The first distinction is between intentions we become conscious of (passive) and consciously formed intentions (active). The second is Fred Dretske's distinction between structuring and triggering causes. I will introduce both distinctions by discussing how they tie in with and strengthen recent criticism of free selection paradigms and support the idea that consciously self-initiated action issues from processes of conscious deliberation and/or information integration. I will argue that consciously self-initiated action typically involves consciously formed intentions that are the structuring causes of our actions. This notion of conscious intentional action allows us to identify at least four stages in which unconscious processes co-determine our actions-without undermining their self-initiated character.
本杰明·利贝特发起的研究表明，短期的有意识意图并非身体行动的起始点。然而，其他研究，尤其是关于长期意图的研究，似乎表明至少某些有意识意图是有效的。这引发了一种观点，即意志是有意识和无意识过程之间的复杂相互作用。这种相互作用的性质和结构大多仍未被探索。在本文中，我将突出两个目前被忽视的区别，这将有助于探索这片领域。第一个区别是我们意识到的意图（被动的）和有意识形成的意图（主动的）之间的区别。第二个是弗雷德·德雷茨克对结构原因和触发原因的区分。我将通过讨论它们如何与对自由选择范式的近期批评相联系并强化这种批评，以及如何支持有意识自我发起的行动源自有意识思考和/或信息整合过程这一观点，来介绍这两个区别。我将论证，有意识自我发起的行动通常涉及有意识形成的意图，这些意图是我们行动的结构原因。这种有意识的意向行动概念使我们能够识别出至少四个阶段，在这些阶段中，无意识过程共同决定我们的行动——而不会削弱其自我发起的特征。
