China Institute of Manufacturing Development, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Nanjing, 210044, People's Republic of China.
School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Nanjing, 210044, People's Republic of China.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2019 Jun;26(17):17644-17654. doi: 10.1007/s11356-019-05215-w. Epub 2019 Apr 26.
The implementation of the extended producer responsibility (EPR) for e-waste is an important measure to develop an ecological civilization. In order to advance manufacturing enterprises to effectively implement resource and environmental responsibility, this study investigates the main causes of environmental regulation failure from the perspective of government and enterprises. The game theory was used to establish an evolutionary game model between government regulatory departments and electronic and electrical products' manufacturing enterprises. A system dynamic model was utilized to construct the stock-flow graph of the game between government and enterprises, and to carry out simulation analysis under different strategies. The results found that the probability of an enterprise undertaking extended responsibility gradually increased and stabilized with the increase of government supervision and punishment intensity; the government's regulatory probability and punishment are important factors affecting the enterprises' compliance with regulations and responsibilities. The study suggests that government should focus on strengthening environmental regulations from the aspects of improving laws and regulations, establishing a regular monitoring system and innovating incentive and constraint mechanism.
电子废物实施生产者责任延伸制度是发展生态文明的重要举措。为了推动制造企业有效履行资源环境责任，本研究从政府和企业两个视角出发，探讨环境规制失效的主要原因。运用博弈论方法，构建了政府监管部门与电子电气产品制造企业之间的演化博弈模型，采用系统动力学方法构建了政企演化博弈的存量-流量图，并进行了不同策略下的仿真分析。结果表明，随着政府监管和处罚力度的增加，企业承担延伸责任的概率逐渐增加并趋于稳定；政府监管概率和处罚力度是影响企业履行合规责任的重要因素。研究建议政府应从完善法律法规、建立常态监测体系和创新激励约束机制等方面着手，切实加强环境规制。
