Zhang Na, Yang Yingjie, Wang Xiaodong, Wang Xinfeng
School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000, China.
Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China.
Vaccines (Basel). 2020 May 31;8(2):267. doi: 10.3390/vaccines8020267.
The harm caused by defective vaccines to human health and social stability is immeasurable. Aiming at the government's supervision of the vaccine market, an evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the quality of supervision and the key factors in the dynamic interaction between government departments and vaccine manufacturers under different supervision modes in the vaccine manufacturing process. The results show that: (1) Severe punishment by government regulatory authorities, and increased costs of rectification after investigation and handling of involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises can effectively prevent involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises. (2) In the early stage of the game, the success rate of the government's efficient supervision will make the vaccine enterprises continuously self-disciplined; when the vaccine market is relatively stable, the government's supervision departments tend to be more conducive to passive supervision. (3) The success rate of government regulatory departments and the probability of a third-party reporting to play a great role in promoting the self-discipline of enterprises. (4) The power of government and regulation are conducive to promoting the active supervision of the government regulatory authorities but corruption of government and awareness of people are different. Once the phenomenon of vaccine enterprises' non-discipline increases, the government regulation must change from passive regulation to active regulation. Therefore, the government should implement different measures according to the characteristics of each period in the manufacturing process to effectively prevent problematic vaccines. The conclusions and policy recommendations are significant for addressing the issue of insufficient self-discipline of vaccine manufacturers.
不合格疫苗对人类健康和社会稳定造成的危害不可估量。针对政府对疫苗市场的监管，构建进化博弈模型，分析疫苗生产过程中不同监管模式下政府部门与疫苗生产企业动态互动中的监管质量及关键因素。结果表明：（1）政府监管部门严厉处罚，以及对疫苗企业非自愿行为查处后的整改成本增加，能有效防范疫苗企业的非自愿行为。（2）在博弈初期，政府高效监管的成功率会使疫苗企业不断自律；当疫苗市场相对稳定时，政府监管部门倾向于更有利于被动监管。（3）政府监管部门的成功率和第三方举报概率对促进企业自律作用很大。（4）政府权力和监管有利于促进政府监管部门主动监管，但政府腐败和民众意识不同。一旦疫苗企业不自律现象增多，政府监管必须从被动监管转变为主动监管。因此，政府应根据生产过程各阶段特点实施不同措施，有效防范问题疫苗。研究结论和政策建议对解决疫苗生产企业自律不足问题具有重要意义。
