Beyond the "Conceptual Nervous System": Can computational cognitive neuroscience transform learning theory?

In the last century, learning theory has been dominated by an approach assuming that associations between hypothetical representational nodes can support the acquisition of knowledge about the environment. The similarities between this approach and connectionism did not go unnoticed to learning theorists, with many of them explicitly adopting a neural network approach in the modeling of learning phenomena. Skinner famously criticized such use of hypothetical neural structures for the explanation of behavior (the "Conceptual Nervous System"), and one aspect of his criticism has proven to be correct: theory underdetermination is a pervasive problem in cognitive modeling in general, and in associationist and connectionist models in particular. That is, models implementing two very different cognitive processes often make the exact same behavioral predictions, meaning that important theoretical questions posed by contrasting the two models remain unanswered. We show through several examples that theory underdetermination is common in the learning theory literature, affecting the solvability of some of the most important theoretical problems that have been posed in the last decades. Computational cognitive neuroscience (CCN) offers a solution to this problem, by including neurobiological constraints in computational models of behavior and cognition. Rather than simply being inspired by neural computation, CCN models are built to reflect as much as possible about the actual neural structures thought to underlie a particular behavior. They go beyond the "Conceptual Nervous System" and offer a true integration of behavioral and neural levels of analysis.