Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom.
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom; École Normale Supérieure, Département des Études Cognitives, Paris, France.
Cognition. 2020 Jan;194:104041. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104041. Epub 2019 Aug 27.
Studies of metacognition often measure confidence in perceptual decisions. Much less is known about metacognition of action, and specifically about how people estimate the success of their own actions. In the present study, we compare metacognitive abilities between voluntary actions, passive movements matched to those actions, and purely visual signals. Participants reported their confidence in judging whether a brief visual probe appeared ahead or behind of their finger during simple flexion/extension movement. The finger could be moved voluntarily, or could be moved passively by a robot replaying their own previous movements. In a third condition, participants did not move, but a visual cursor replayed their previous voluntary movements. Metacognitive sensitivity was comparable when judging active movements, during passive finger displacement and visual cursor reply. However, a progressive metacognitive bias was found, with active movements leading to overconfidence in first-level judgement relative to passive movements, at equal levels of actual evidence. Further, both active and passive movements produced overconfidence relative to visual signals. Taken together, our results may partly explain some of the peculiarities that arise when one judges one's own actions.
元认知研究通常衡量对感知决策的信心。关于动作的元认知，特别是关于人们如何估计自己动作的成功，人们知之甚少。在本研究中，我们比较了自愿动作、与这些动作相匹配的被动动作以及纯粹的视觉信号之间的元认知能力。参与者报告了他们在判断短暂的视觉探测在他们的手指前面还是后面出现时的信心，在简单的弯曲/伸展运动中。手指可以自愿移动，也可以由机器人重放他们自己之前的运动来被动移动。在第三个条件下，参与者没有移动，但一个视觉光标重放了他们之前的自愿运动。在判断主动运动、被动手指位移和视觉光标回复时，元认知敏感性相当。然而，发现了一种渐进的元认知偏差，在相同的实际证据水平上，主动运动相对于被动运动导致第一级判断的过度自信。此外，主动和被动运动相对于视觉信号都产生了过度自信。总的来说，我们的结果可能部分解释了在判断自己的动作时出现的一些特殊性。
