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中国流域生态补偿中政府决策行为及影响因素的演化博弈分析

An evolutionary game analysis of governments' decision-making behaviors and factors influencing watershed ecological compensation in China.

机构信息

Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing, 211100, China.

Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing, 211100, China; College of Agricultural Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing, 211100, China.

出版信息

J Environ Manage. 2019 Dec 1;251:109592. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109592. Epub 2019 Sep 27.

DOI:10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109592
PMID:31569022
Abstract

As a way to coordinate the interests of multi-government and solve the problem of transboundary water pollution, watershed ecological compensation system has been promoted in China. It is necessary to understand the influencing factors of watershed ecological compensation from the perspective of how interactions occur between different governments. This paper analyses the interaction among upstream governments, downstream governments and the central government in the Eastern Route of South-to-North Water Transfer Project, using evolutionary game theory. In particular, how ecological benefits are distributed between upstream and downstream governments is analyzed. Simultaneously, numerical simulation is used to analyze the effects of influencing factors on governments' behaviors. The results show that: (1) the initial willingness of governments to corporate affect their final behaviors; (2) upstream and downstream governments cannot spontaneously cooperate to implement watershed ecological compensation system without supervision of the central government; (3) opportunity costs only have a significant impact on upstream governments; (4) punishment on downstream governments can effectively influence the behaviors of governments at all levels; (5) high ecological compensation fee improve downstream governments' willness not to pay; (6) upstream governments get about 78% of ecological benefits due to the implementation of watershed ecological compensation system.

摘要

为协调多方政府利益,解决跨界水污染问题,中国推行了流域生态补偿制度。有必要从不同政府间相互作用的角度来了解流域生态补偿的影响因素。本文运用演化博弈理论,分析了南水北调东线工程中上游政府、下游政府与中央政府之间的相互作用,特别是分析了上下游政府之间如何分配生态效益。同时,运用数值模拟分析了影响因素对政府行为的影响。结果表明:(1)政府合作的初始意愿影响其最终行为;(2)没有中央政府的监督,上下游政府无法自发合作实施流域生态补偿制度;(3)机会成本仅对上游政府有显著影响;(4)对下游政府的惩罚可以有效影响各级政府的行为;(5)高生态补偿费用降低了下游政府的支付意愿;(6)由于流域生态补偿制度的实施,上游政府获得了约 78%的生态效益。

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