Soltanolkottabi Marzieh, Ben-Arieh David, Wu Chih-Hang
Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Systems EngineeringKansas State UniversityManhattanKS66506USA.
IEEE Trans Comput Soc Syst. 2019 Mar 7;6(2):268-276. doi: 10.1109/TCSS.2019.2896227. eCollection 2019 Apr.
Epidemics of infectious disease can be traced back to the early days of mankind. Only in the last two centuries vaccination has become a viable strategy to prevent such epidemics. In addition to the clinical efficacy of this strategy, the behavior and public attitudes affect the success of vaccines. This paper describes modeling the efficacy of vaccination considering the cost and benefit of vaccination to individual players. The model is based on the public goods game and is presented as a spatial game on a lattice. Using this model, individuals can contribute to the public health by paying the cost of vaccination or choose to be protected by the public who is vaccinated rather than pay the cost and share the risk of vaccination. Thus, in this model individuals can choose to stay susceptible, can become infected, or choose to vaccinate once in each episode. This paper presents the behavioral changes of the population and the cost to the society as a function of the cost of vaccines, cost of being infected, and the "fear factor" created by the public media.
传染病的流行可以追溯到人类早期。直到最近两个世纪，疫苗接种才成为预防此类流行的可行策略。除了该策略的临床疗效外，行为和公众态度也会影响疫苗的成功。本文描述了在考虑疫苗接种对个体参与者的成本和收益的情况下对疫苗接种效果进行建模。该模型基于公共物品博弈，并作为晶格上的空间博弈呈现。使用此模型，个体可以通过支付疫苗接种成本为公共卫生做出贡献，或者选择由接种疫苗的公众提供保护，而不是支付成本并承担疫苗接种风险。因此，在这个模型中，个体可以选择保持易感、被感染，或者在每一轮中选择接种一次疫苗。本文展示了作为疫苗成本、感染成本以及公共媒体产生的“恐惧因素”的函数的人群行为变化和社会成本。
