Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine.
Psychol Rev. 2021 Mar;128(2):336-361. doi: 10.1037/rev0000263. Epub 2020 Sep 24.
We demonstrate through theoretical, empirical, and sociocultural evidence that the concept of impulsivity fails the basic requirements of a psychological construct and should be rejected as such. Impulsivity (or impulsiveness) currently holds a central place in psychological theory, research, and clinical practice and is considered a multifaceted concept. However, impulsivity falls short of the theoretical specifications for hypothetical constructs by having meaning that is not compatible with psychometric, neuroscience, and clinical data. Psychometric findings indicate that impulsive traits and behaviors (e.g., response inhibition, delay discounting) are largely uncorrelated and fail to load onto a single, superordinate latent variable. Modern neuroscience has also failed to identify a specific and central neurobehavioral mechanism underlying impulsive behaviors and instead has found separate neurochemical systems and loci that contribute to a variety of impulsivity types. Clinically, these different impulsivity types show diverging and distinct pathways and processes relating to behavioral and psychosocial health. The predictive validity and sensitivity of impulsivity measures to pharmacological, behavioral, and cognitive interventions also vary based on the impulsivity type evaluated and clinical condition examined. Conflation of distinct personality and behavioral mechanisms under a single umbrella of impulsivity ultimately increases the likelihood of misunderstanding at a sociocultural level and facilitates misled hypothesizing and artificial inconsistencies for clinical translation. We strongly recommend that, based on this comprehensive evidence, psychological scientists and neuroscientists reject the language of impulsivity in favor of a specific focus on the several well-defined and empirically supported factors that impulsivity is purported to cover. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
我们通过理论、实证和社会文化证据表明,冲动概念不符合心理结构的基本要求,因此应该被拒绝。冲动(或冲动性)目前在心理理论、研究和临床实践中占据核心地位,被认为是一个多方面的概念。然而,冲动在理论上不符合假设结构的规范,因为它的含义与心理测量学、神经科学和临床数据不兼容。心理测量学的研究结果表明,冲动的特征和行为(例如,反应抑制、延迟折扣)在很大程度上是不相关的,无法归入一个单一的、上级的潜在变量。现代神经科学也未能确定冲动行为背后的特定和核心神经行为机制,而是发现了不同的神经化学系统和位置,这些系统和位置对各种冲动类型都有贡献。在临床上,这些不同的冲动类型表现出不同的、不同的与行为和心理社会健康相关的途径和过程。冲动测量对药理学、行为和认知干预的预测有效性和敏感性也因所评估的冲动类型和所检查的临床状况而异。将不同的人格和行为机制混为一谈,最终会增加在社会文化层面上的误解的可能性,并为临床转化提供误导性的假设和人为的不一致。我们强烈建议,基于这一全面的证据,心理科学家和神经科学家应该摒弃冲动的语言,转而专注于几个经过明确界定和经验支持的因素,这些因素被认为涵盖了冲动。(PsycInfo 数据库记录(c)2021 APA,保留所有权利)。