Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China.
National Engineering Research Center of Water Resources Efficient Utilization and Engineering Safety, Nanjing 210098, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2020 Oct 20;17(20):7638. doi: 10.3390/ijerph17207638.
The issue of trans-boundary water conflict has become an important factor affecting the relations between basin countries. The key to solve the current conflict problem is to realize the fair and reasonable allocation of trans-boundary water resources. Based on the satisfaction perspective, we developed an asymmetric Nash negotiation model to obtain an optimal and feasible allocation scheme for the trans-boundary water resources. Firstly, based on the two international water laws, we analyzed the influencing factors including water demand differences, resource endowment differences, and water efficiency differences, and by combing with the flexible weight constraint, we built the fair and reasonable allocation pattern for trans-boundary water resources. Secondly, under the constraint of the allocation pattern, we determined the ideal negotiation scheme of each basin country by considering their selection preference. Thirdly, we built a satisfaction degree function and established an asymmetric Nash negotiation model. This is used to build a fair negotiation mechanism among basin countries, and the allocation scheme after negotiation is regarded as the optimal allocation scheme. Lastly, we took the Lancang-Mekong river basin as an example. For this example, the results indicate the following: (1) after considering multiple factors comprehensively, China and Thailand obtained a higher proportion of trans-boundary water resource quota under different preference scenarios, while Myanmar obtained a lower proportion of trans-boundary water resource quota; (2) taking each basin country as the negotiation agent, the optimal allocation scheme with the introduction of fair negotiation mechanism has a higher degree of satisfaction, with an average of over 87.19%, which is more stable and easy to be accepted by all basin countries; (3) from the perspective of the change rate and the average satisfaction of the basin countries, the optimal allocation scheme under the resource endowment preference scenario obtained the highest satisfaction among basin countries. This study aims to improve the practicability and acceptability of trans-boundary water resources allocation, thus providing technical support for reducing trans-boundary water resources conflicts.
跨界水冲突问题已成为影响流域国家关系的重要因素。解决当前冲突问题的关键是实现跨境水资源的公平合理分配。基于满意度视角，我们构建了非对称纳什谈判模型，以获得跨境水资源的最优可行分配方案。首先，基于两项国际水法，分析了包括需水差异、资源赋存差异和用水效率差异在内的影响因素，结合灵活权重约束，构建了跨境水资源公平合理的分配模式。其次，在分配模式的约束下，考虑各国的选择偏好，确定各流域国的理想谈判方案。再次，构建满意度函数，建立非对称纳什谈判模型，构建流域国家之间的公平谈判机制，将谈判后的分配方案视为最优分配方案。最后，以澜沧江-湄公河流域为例进行实证研究。结果表明：（1）综合考虑多种因素后，在不同偏好情景下，中国和泰国获得了更高比例的跨境水资源配额，而缅甸获得的跨境水资源配额比例较低；（2）以各流域国为谈判主体，引入公平谈判机制的最优分配方案满意度更高，平均超过 87.19%，更加稳定，容易被各流域国接受；（3）从流域国变化率和平均满意度来看，资源赋存偏好情景下的最优分配方案流域国满意度最高。本研究旨在提高跨境水资源分配的实用性和可接受性，为减少跨境水资源冲突提供技术支持。
