School of Transportation and Civil Engineering, Nantong University, Nantong 226019, China.
Department of Traffic Engineering & Key Laboratory of Road and Traffic Engineering, Ministry of Education, Tongji University, 4800 Cao'an Road, Shanghai 201804, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2020 Nov 15;17(22):8457. doi: 10.3390/ijerph17228457.
An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis method is developed in this study to understand the interactions between cyclists' traffic violations and the enforcement strategies. The evolutionary equilibrium stabilities were analysed under a fixed (FPS) and a dynamic penalty strategy (DPS). The simulation-based numerical experiments show that: (i) the proposed method can be used to study the interactions between traffic violations and the enforcement strategies; (ii) FPS and DPS can reduce cyclists' probability of committing traffic violations when the perceived traffic violations' relative benefit is less than the traffic violation penalty and the enforcement cost is less than the enforcement benefit, and using DPS can yield a stable enforcement outcome for law enforcement compared to using FPS; and (iii) strategy-related (penalty amount, enforcement effectiveness, and enforcement cost) and attitudinal factors (perceived relative benefit, relative public image cost, and cyclists' attitude towards risk) can affect the enforcement strategy's impacts on reducing cyclists' traffic violations.
本研究采用进化博弈理论分析方法,研究了自行车骑行者交通违法行为与执法策略之间的相互作用。在固定罚款策略(FPS)和动态罚款策略(DPS)下,分析了进化均衡稳定性。基于模拟的数值实验表明:(i)所提出的方法可用于研究交通违法行为与执法策略之间的相互作用;(ii)当感知到的交通违法行为的相对收益小于交通违法行为的罚款和执法成本小于执法收益时,FPS 和 DPS 可以降低自行车骑行者交通违法行为的概率,与使用 FPS 相比,使用 DPS 可以为执法带来更稳定的执法结果;(iii)策略相关因素(罚款金额、执法效果和执法成本)和态度因素(感知的相对收益、相对公共形象成本和自行车骑行者对风险的态度)会影响执法策略对减少自行车骑行者交通违法行为的影响。