Tu Yu, Peng Benhong, Elahi Ehsan, Wu Weiku
School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China.
School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Nanjing 210044, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2020 Dec 8;17(24):9152. doi: 10.3390/ijerph17249152.
Behind the environmental regulatory capture (ERC) lies a complex network of interactions and interests. Identifying the roles of stakeholders in the ERC network and their behavioral motives can illuminate the mechanism of ERC incidents, and provide policy recommendations for reducing other types of regulatory capture. Drawing on the regulatory capture and principal-agent theories, this study develops a triple-layer principal-agent model of environmental regulation practices in China. We further conduct a social network analysis (SNA) on the ERC case in the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) of Bobai County, Guangxi Province, China to illustrate the hidden interactions and interest transmission structure among stakeholders in ERC. The results show that the ERC presents obvious characteristics of concealment and complexity, and individual capture often evolves into collective capture. Different stakeholders are in different positions and play different roles in the network. The environmental regulatory authority, the commissioned regulatory agency, and the agency of enterprises form the core power circle of the ERC network, in which the first two play the role of intermediary and the latter acts as an initiator. They together occupy the structural hole position and dominate the evolution of the ERC network. Peripheral structure stakeholders play the role of "bridge" and profit from the expanding ERC network. It is recommended that the principle of decentralization and the balance of power must be taken into consideration. Quantitative analysis methods such as SNA should be applied to clarify accountability when punishing responsible persons. More subjects are also encouraged to participate in environmental regulations and report illegal acts actively. Finally, a blacklist system should be established in the field of environmental protection for regulating the professional and social morality of all parties.
环境监管俘获（ERC）背后是一个复杂的互动和利益网络。识别利益相关者在ERC网络中的角色及其行为动机，可以阐明ERC事件的机制，并为减少其他类型的监管俘获提供政策建议。本研究借鉴监管俘获理论和委托代理理论，构建了中国环境监管实践的三层委托代理模型。我们进一步对中国广西博白县环境保护局（EPB）的ERC案例进行社会网络分析（SNA），以阐明ERC中利益相关者之间隐藏的互动和利益传递结构。结果表明，ERC呈现出明显的隐蔽性和复杂性特征，个体俘获往往演变为集体俘获。不同利益相关者在网络中处于不同位置，发挥着不同作用。环境监管部门、委托监管机构和企业机构构成了ERC网络的核心权力圈，其中前两者扮演中介角色，后者充当发起者。他们共同占据结构洞位置，主导着ERC网络的演变。外围结构利益相关者扮演“桥梁”角色，并从不断扩大的ERC网络中获利。建议考虑权力分散和平衡原则。应应用SNA等定量分析方法，在惩罚责任人时明确责任归属。还应鼓励更多主体参与环境监管并积极举报违法行为。最后，应在环境保护领域建立黑名单制度，以规范各方的职业和社会道德。
