Department of Philosophy, University of Denver, 264 Sturm Hall, 2000 E. Asbury Ave., Denver, CO, 80208, USA.
Hist Philos Life Sci. 2021 Feb 22;43(1):26. doi: 10.1007/s40656-021-00381-y.
During his celebrated 1922 debate with Bergson, Einstein famously proclaimed: "the time of the philosopher does not exist, there remains only a psychological time that differs from the physicist's." Einstein's dictum, I maintain, has been metabolized by the natural sciences, which typically presuppose, more or less explicitly, the existence of a single, univocal, temporal substratum, ultimately determined by physics. This reductionistic assumption pervades much biological and biomedical practice. The chronological age allotted to individuals is conceived as an objective quantity, allowing one to straightforwardly assign and compare the biological age of organisms. This essay argues that the standard practice of assessing the age and aging of organisms against the backdrop of a physical conception of time is problematic. This becomes especially evident in light of recent discoveries of various levels of senescence underlying the development of individual organisms-a phenomenon known as 'age mosaicism.' The bottom line is that the study of age and aging requires a biological conception of time, as opposed to a physical one. Einstein clearly wasn't wrong about his operationalization of time in relativity theory. Still time may be less monolithic than he surmised.
在 1922 年与伯格森的著名辩论中,爱因斯坦曾宣称:“哲学家的时间并不存在,只存在与物理学家的时间不同的心理学时间。”我认为,爱因斯坦的这一论断已经被自然科学所吸收,自然科学通常或多或少地预设了一个单一的、单一的、时间的基础,最终由物理学决定。这种还原论的假设充斥着许多生物和生物医学实践。分配给个人的年龄被视为一个客观的数量,允许人们直接分配和比较生物体的生物年龄。本文认为,根据物理时间的概念来评估生物体的年龄和衰老的标准做法是有问题的。这在最近发现个体生物发育过程中存在各种层次的衰老(即“年龄镶嵌”)的情况下尤为明显。底线是,对年龄和衰老的研究需要一种生物学的时间概念,而不是物理学的时间概念。爱因斯坦在相对论中对时间的操作显然没有错。尽管如此,时间可能并不像他推测的那样单一。