Baron J, Hershey J C
Psychology Department, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 19104-6916.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 1988 Apr;54(4):569-79. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.54.4.569.
In 5 studies, undergraduate subjects were given descriptions and outcomes of decisions made by others under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions concerned either medical matters or monetary gambles. Subjects rated the quality of thinking of the decisions, the competence of the decision maker, or their willingness to let the decision maker decide on their behalf. Subjects understood that they had all relevant information available to the decision maker. Subjects rated the thinking as better, rated the decision maker as more competent, or indicated greater willingness to yield the decision when the outcome was favorable than when it was unfavorable. In monetary gambles, subjects rated the thinking as better when the outcome of the option not chosen turned out poorly than when it turned out well. Although subjects who were asked felt that they should not consider outcomes in making these evaluations, they did so. This effect of outcome knowledge on evaluation may be explained partly in terms of its effect on the salience of arguments for each side of the choice. Implications for the theory of rationality and for practical situations are discussed.
在5项研究中，给本科受试者提供了他人在不确定情况下做出的决策描述及结果。决策涉及医疗事务或金钱赌博。受试者对决策的思维质量、决策者的能力，或他们让决策者代表自己做决定的意愿进行评分。受试者明白他们拥有决策者可获得的所有相关信息。当结果有利时，受试者对思维的评分更高，对决策者能力的评价更高，或表示更愿意让决策者做决定，而当结果不利时则不然。在金钱赌博中，当未被选择的选项结果不佳时，受试者对思维的评分比结果良好时更高。尽管被询问的受试者觉得他们在进行这些评估时不应考虑结果，但他们还是这么做了。结果知识对评估的这种影响，部分可以从其对选择各方论据显著性的影响来解释。文中讨论了对理性理论和实际情况的影响。
