Associate Research Scholar, James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton University, Department of Politics. Ph.D., University of Padua, School of Law, and University of Innsbruck, Austria, 2015. Adapted from a presentation delivered at the University of Notre Dame de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture's 2019 Fall Conference, 'I Have Called You Friends,' Nov. 9, 2019.
Issues Law Med. 2020 Fall;35(2):131-171.
Legal cases involving "assisted suicide" and euthanasia have dramatically increased over the past decades. European news is filled with hard cases involving people whose experiences of pain and suffering are used to advance the cause of further decriminalization. Another kind of case, however, is gaining public attention and revealing the fallacious narrative of death as a human right. These are cases of people who live where such practices are already legal, but who may have preferred life over death were the practice criminally sanctioned. A suicide case from the Netherlands will be the starting point for a broader reflection on the existence of a "right to die," and on the soundness of an alternative "duty to care." Creating a parallel between a Dutch case of "death by starvation" and a recent Italian constitutional judgment (which led to a partial decriminalization-or exemption from punishment-of some forms of assisted suicide) the author aims to show that: a) there is inevitably an international dimension to the problem, b) laws shape human behavior, and they do so internationally. What once was prohibited, and later decriminalized, has gradually become tolerated, welcomed, and is now entertained as a human right. A right to die, however, contradicts the very basis of our common living. After presenting the facts of a suicide recently committed by a Dutch teenager, the author will focus on Netherland's norms regarding assisted suicide and euthanasia, and the specific medical guidelines that apply to the so-called "choice to stop eating and drinking so as to hasten the end of life (SED)." In the third chapter, the author will underscore the importance of intent, and address the radical difference that exists between an act of suicide and the choice to refuse treatment. The author then analyzes the relevant criminal provisions in Italian legislation, which prohibit euthanasia and assisted suicide, with a particular focus on the recent decision n. 242/2019, issued by the Italian Constitutional Court. This judgment relaxed the existing ban on assisted suicide and thereby compromised Italy's absolute protection of life by adopting an overly broad understanding of individual autonomy. In the final chapter, the author defends the idea that only where is combined with individual liberties are justly ordered, and human rights effectively protected. This solidarity, implicit in norms such as "Bad Samaritan Laws" that impose legal duties to rescue, is not mere altruism, but a form of self-love, as it creates the beneficial conditions of harmony and friendliness among citizens.
在过去的几十年里，涉及“协助自杀”和安乐死的法律案件急剧增加。欧洲新闻充斥着涉及那些经历痛苦和苦难的人的艰难案例，这些案例被用来推动进一步非刑罪化的事业。然而，另一种情况也引起了公众的关注，并揭示了将死亡视为一种人权的错误说法。这些都是在已经合法实施此类做法的地方生活的人，但如果这些做法被刑事定罪，他们可能更愿意选择生存而不是死亡。荷兰的一个自杀案例将成为更广泛反思“死亡权利”以及替代“照顾义务”是否合理的起点。通过将荷兰的“饥饿致死”案例与意大利最近的宪法判决（该判决导致部分协助自杀形式的刑事定罪或豁免）进行平行比较，作者旨在表明：a）这个问题不可避免地具有国际层面；b）法律塑造人类行为，并且在国际上也是如此。曾经被禁止、后来非刑罪化的行为，逐渐被容忍、被接受，并现在被视为一种人权。然而，死亡权利与我们共同生活的基础相悖。在介绍了最近一名荷兰青少年自杀的事实后，作者将重点介绍荷兰有关协助自杀和安乐死的规范以及适用于所谓“停止进食和饮水以加速生命终结的选择（SED）”的具体医疗准则。在第三章中，作者将强调意图的重要性，并指出自杀行为和拒绝治疗之间存在的根本区别。作者随后分析了意大利立法中的相关刑事规定，这些规定禁止安乐死和协助自杀，并特别关注意大利宪法法院最近作出的第 242/2019 号判决。该判决放宽了对协助自杀的现有禁令，从而通过对个人自主权的过度宽泛理解，损害了意大利对生命的绝对保护。在最后一章中，作者捍卫了这样一种观点，即只有当个人自由与个人自由相结合时，个人自由才会得到公正的安排，人权才能得到有效保护。这种团结隐含在“巴德萨马拉法案”等规范中，这些规范规定了救援的法律义务，它不仅仅是利他主义，而是一种自我爱护，因为它创造了公民之间和谐友好的有益条件。
