Takahashi Ryo, Tanaka Kenta
Graduate School of Economics Waseda University Tokyo Japan.
Faculty of Economics Musashi University Tokyo Japan.
Econ Inq. 2021 Oct;59(4):1467-1482. doi: 10.1111/ecin.13020. Epub 2021 Jul 18.
In response to the novel coronavirus outbreak, the Japanese government requested the temporary closure of businesses. Consequently, complying with restrictions came to be recognized as the social norm, and stores that continued with business as usual were seen as norm-breakers. This study empirically investigates costly punishment behavior for stores' violation of restrictions and how this behavior changes when a decision-maker receives information pertaining to contrasting norms, implicitly requiring the opposite response. By implementing joy-of-destruction minigames, we found that costly punishment behavior for norm-breakers was significantly stimulated (by approximately 11%) but not increased when additional information was provided.
针对新型冠状病毒的爆发，日本政府要求企业暂时停业。因此，遵守限制措施成为了社会规范，照常营业的商店被视为违反规范者。本研究实证调查了对商店违反限制措施的代价高昂的惩罚行为，以及当决策者收到与对比规范相关的信息（隐含地要求相反的反应）时，这种行为是如何变化的。通过实施破坏游戏迷你游戏，我们发现对违反规范者的代价高昂的惩罚行为被显著激发（约11%），但在提供额外信息时并没有增加。
