Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, United States.
Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, United States.
Addict Behav. 2022 Feb;125:107147. doi: 10.1016/j.addbeh.2021.107147. Epub 2021 Oct 11.
We analyze the tobacco industry's "tort reform" campaign in Louisiana, which marked its first takeover of a state tort reform coalition, and interpret the strategies using the Policy Dystopia Model. We searched internal tobacco industry documents in the UCSF Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library and searched news archives of state and local periodicals between 1985 and 2000. Using alliances, the tobacco industry clandestinely secured legislation in 1988 limiting manufacturer liability for inherently dangerous products. The industry took over a coalition in 1992 to defend its gains, minimize its publicly visible role, and pursue policies it likely could not directly advocate for after Louisiana's government became more hostile to tort reform. The industry defended gains but failed to secure legislation eliminating liability for inherently dangerous products after its involvement was exposed. This case study expands the applicability of the Policy Dystopia Model. The industry passes laws harmful to the public interest by cloaking its involvement and motivations behind allies, front groups and generalized messaging. Exposing the industry's role can help public health advocates protect against pro-industry legislation.
我们分析了烟草业在路易斯安那州的“侵权改革”活动，这标志着其首次接管了一个州的侵权改革联盟，并使用政策灾难模型来解释这些策略。我们在旧金山加州大学烟草真相文件图书馆中搜索了内部烟草业文件，并在 1985 年至 2000 年期间搜索了州和地方期刊的新闻档案。利用联盟，烟草业在 1988 年秘密获得了立法，限制制造商对固有危险产品的责任。1992 年，该行业接管了一个联盟，以捍卫其既得利益，最小化其公开可见的角色，并在路易斯安那州政府对侵权改革变得更加敌对之后，推行其可能无法直接倡导的政策。该行业捍卫了既得利益，但在其参与曝光后，未能确保立法消除对固有危险产品的责任。这一案例研究扩展了政策灾难模型的适用性。该行业通过掩盖其盟友、幌子组织和一般性信息背后的参与和动机，通过立法为公众利益带来危害。揭露行业的角色可以帮助公共卫生倡导者防范支持行业的立法。
