McDiarmid Alex D, Tullett Alexa M, Whitt Cassie M, Vazire Simine, Smaldino Paul E, Stephens Jeremy E
Department of Psychology, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA.
Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia.
Nat Hum Behav. 2021 Dec;5(12):1663-1673. doi: 10.1038/s41562-021-01220-7. Epub 2021 Nov 22.
Self-correction-a key feature distinguishing science from pseudoscience-requires that scientists update their beliefs in light of new evidence. However, people are often reluctant to change their beliefs. We examined belief updating in action by tracking research psychologists' beliefs in psychological effects before and after the completion of four large-scale replication projects. We found that psychologists did update their beliefs; they updated as much as they predicted they would, but not as much as our Bayesian model suggests they should if they trust the results. We found no evidence that psychologists became more critical of replications when it would have preserved their pre-existing beliefs. We also found no evidence that personal investment or lack of expertise discouraged belief updating, but people higher on intellectual humility updated their beliefs slightly more. Overall, our results suggest that replication studies can contribute to self-correction within psychology, but psychologists may underweight their evidentiary value.
自我修正——区分科学与伪科学的一个关键特征——要求科学家根据新证据更新他们的信念。然而，人们往往不愿改变自己的信念。我们通过追踪研究心理学家在四个大规模重复项目完成前后对心理效应的信念，来考察实际中的信念更新情况。我们发现心理学家确实更新了他们的信念；他们的更新程度与他们预期的一样，但没有达到我们的贝叶斯模型所建议的程度，即如果他们相信研究结果就应该达到的程度。我们没有发现证据表明，当复制结果会维护他们先前的信念时，心理学家会对重复研究更加挑剔。我们也没有发现证据表明个人投入或缺乏专业知识会阻碍信念更新，但智力谦逊程度较高的人信念更新得稍多一些。总体而言，我们的结果表明，重复研究可以促进心理学内部的自我修正，但心理学家可能没有充分重视其证据价值。
