Department of Philosophy, Lewis & Clark College, Portland, Oregon, USA.
Wiley Interdiscip Rev Cogn Sci. 2022 Jan;13(1):e1584. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1584. Epub 2021 Nov 26.
Rejecting the received account, which includes procedural and semantic memory, Stanley B. Klein claims that only episodic memory is genuine memory. This is so, he asserts, because only episodic memory is partly constituted by a quale, a Nagelian "what it is like" feeling of the past. However, his actual position reveals a very different set of claims about memory, one that involves a distinctive feel, distinct from Nagelian qualia and other versions of what qualia are. We argue that Klein's actual position significantly differs from what he claims memory is. And we try to describe what Kleinian qualia should feel like. We suspect that they might not feel like anything at all. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Psychological Capacities.
摒弃包括程序记忆和语义记忆在内的传统观点，斯坦利·B·克莱因（Stanley B. Klein）声称只有情景记忆才是真正的记忆。他断言，之所以如此，是因为只有情景记忆部分由“感受质”构成，即一种纳格尔式的“过去是什么样的”感觉。然而，他的实际立场揭示了关于记忆的一套截然不同的主张，这涉及到一种独特的感觉，与纳格尔式感受质和其他版本的感受质不同。我们认为，克莱因的实际立场与他所声称的记忆有很大的不同。我们试图描述一下克莱因式感受质应该是什么样的。我们怀疑它们可能什么感觉都没有。本文属于以下分类：心理学 > 记忆哲学 > 意识哲学 > 心理能力
