Szollosi Aba, Donkin Chris, Newell Ben R
School of Psychology.
Psychol Rev. 2023 Mar;130(2):546-568. doi: 10.1037/rev0000355. Epub 2022 Apr 7.
Referring to probabilistic concepts (such as randomness, sampling, and probability distributions among others) is commonplace in contemporary explanations of how people learn and make decisions in the face of environmental unknowns. Here, we critically evaluate this practice and argue that such concepts should only play a relatively minor part in psychological explanations. To make this point, we provide a theoretical analysis of what people need to do in order to deal with unknown aspects of a typical decision-making task (a repeated-choice gamble). This analysis reveals that the use of probabilistic concepts in psychological explanations may and often does conceal essential, nonprobabilistic steps that people need to take to attempt to solve the problems that environmental unknowns present. To give these steps a central role, we recast how people solve these problems as a type of hypothesis generation and evaluation, of which using probabilistic concepts to deal with unknowns is one of many possibilities. We also demonstrate some immediate practical consequences of our proposed approach in two experiments. This perspective implies a shift in focus toward nonprobabilistic aspects of psychological explanations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
在当代关于人们如何在面对环境未知因素时进行学习和决策的解释中,提及概率概念(如随机性、抽样和概率分布等)是很常见的。在此,我们对这种做法进行批判性评估,并认为此类概念在心理学解释中应仅扮演相对次要的角色。为了说明这一点,我们对人们为应对典型决策任务(重复选择赌博)的未知方面需要做什么进行了理论分析。这一分析表明,在心理学解释中使用概率概念可能而且常常掩盖了人们为试图解决环境未知因素所带来的问题而需要采取的基本的、非概率性的步骤。为了让这些步骤发挥核心作用,我们将人们解决这些问题的方式重新塑造为一种假设生成和评估的类型,其中使用概率概念来处理未知因素只是众多可能性之一。我们还在两个实验中展示了我们提出的方法的一些直接实际后果。这种观点意味着将重点转向心理学解释的非概率性方面。(PsycInfo数据库记录(c)2023美国心理学会,保留所有权利)