Ning Xin, Qiu Yu, Wu Chunlin, Jia Kexin
School of Investment and Construction Management, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, China.
School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing, China.
Front Psychol. 2022 Apr 7;13:861828. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.861828. eCollection 2022.
Without the active participation of enterprises and front-line workers, it is difficult for the government to perform effective supervision to ensure behavioral safety among front-line workers. To overcome inadequate government supervision and information attenuation caused by vertical management mode and limited resources, and to change passive supervision into active control with the proactive participation of enterprises and workers, this paper combines the entity responsibility mechanism and the third-party participation mechanism based on government supervision to analyze the decision-making process of government and enterprises on safety behavior supervision. An evolutionary game model was established to describe the decision-making interactions between the government and construction enterprises under the two mechanisms, and a simulation was performed to illustrate the factors influencing the implementation of the mechanisms. The results show that both mechanisms have a positive effect on government supervision, and the third-party participation mechanism was found to be working better. The implementation of the two mechanisms is influenced by punishment, subsidy, and cost, and it has different sensitivities to the three influencing factors. This study provides a theoretical framework for enhancing the government supervision mechanism, and the decision-making between the government and construction enterprises enhances the management form and guides their actual supervision practices.
没有企业和一线工人的积极参与，政府很难进行有效监管以确保一线工人的行为安全。为克服垂直管理模式和资源有限导致的政府监管不足和信息衰减问题，并通过企业和工人的积极参与将被动监管转变为主动控制，本文结合基于政府监管的主体责任机制和第三方参与机制，分析政府和企业在安全行为监管方面的决策过程。建立了一个演化博弈模型来描述两种机制下政府与建筑企业之间的决策互动，并进行了模拟以说明影响机制实施的因素。结果表明，两种机制对政府监管都有积极作用，且发现第三方参与机制效果更好。两种机制的实施受到惩罚、补贴和成本的影响，并且对这三个影响因素具有不同的敏感性。本研究为加强政府监管机制提供了理论框架，政府与建筑企业之间的决策提升了管理形式并指导了他们的实际监管实践。
