De Marco Gabriel, Douglas Thomas
The Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Suite 8, Littlegate House 16/17 St Ebbe's Street, Oxford, OX1 1PT UK.
Jesus College, Turl Street, Oxford, OX1 3DW UK.
Crim Law Philos. 2022;16(2):373-393. doi: 10.1007/s11572-021-09566-9. Epub 2021 Apr 9.
Neurointerventions-interventions that physically or chemically modulate brain states-are sometimes imposed on criminal offenders for the purposes of diminishing the risk that they will recidivate, or, more generally, of facilitating their rehabilitation. One objection to the nonconsensual implementation of such interventions holds that this expresses a disrespectful message, and is thus impermissible. In this paper, we respond to this objection, focusing on the most developed version of it-that presented by Elizabeth Shaw. We consider a variety of messages that might be expressed by nonconsensual neurointerventions. Depending on the message, we argue either that such interventions do not invariably express this message, that expressing this message is not invariably disrespectful, or that the appeal to disrespect is redundant.
神经干预——通过物理或化学手段调节大脑状态的干预措施——有时会被施加于刑事罪犯身上，目的是降低他们再次犯罪的风险，或者更广泛地说，是为了促进他们的改造。对这种非自愿实施的干预措施的一种反对意见认为，这传达了一种不尊重的信息，因此是不允许的。在本文中，我们回应这一反对意见，重点关注其最完善的版本——伊丽莎白·肖提出的版本。我们考虑了非自愿神经干预可能传达的各种信息。根据信息的不同，我们认为，要么这种干预措施并不总是传达这种信息，要么传达这种信息并不总是不尊重，要么诉诸不尊重是多余的。
