Douglas Thomas
Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Suite 8, Littlegate House, St Ebbes Street, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK.
J Ethics. 2014 Jun 1;18(2):101-122. doi: 10.1007/s10892-014-9161-6.
Criminal offenders are sometimes required, by the institutions of criminal justice, to undergo medical interventions intended to promote rehabilitation. Ethical debate regarding this practice has largely proceeded on the assumption that medical interventions may only permissibly be administered to criminal offenders with their consent. In this article I challenge this assumption by suggesting that committing a crime might render one morally liable to certain forms of medical intervention. I then consider whether it is possible to respond persuasively to this challenge by invoking the right to bodily integrity. I argue that it is not.
刑事司法机构有时会要求罪犯接受旨在促进改造的医学干预措施。关于这种做法的伦理辩论在很大程度上是基于这样一种假设，即只有在获得罪犯同意的情况下，才可以对其进行医学干预。在本文中，我对这一假设提出质疑，认为犯罪可能使人在道德上有责任接受某些形式的医学干预。然后，我考虑是否有可能通过援引身体完整性权利来令人信服地回应这一质疑。我的观点是不可能。
