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保守主义能获得资金支持?关于负面信息在新项目评估中作用的实地实验。

Conservatism Gets Funded? A Field Experiment on the Role of Negative Information in Novel Project Evaluation.

作者信息

Lanei Jacqueline N, Teplitskiy Misha, Gray Gary, Ranu Hardeep, Menietti Michael, Guinan Eva, Lakhani Karim R

机构信息

Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts 02163.

Laboratory for Innovation Science at Harvard, Boston, Massachusetts 02134.

出版信息

Manage Sci. 2022 Jun;68(6):4478-4495. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4107. Epub 2021 Oct 28.

Abstract

The evaluation and selection of novel projects lies at the heart of scientific and technological innovation, and yet there are persistent concerns about bias, such as conservatism. This paper investigates the role that the format of evaluation, specifically information sharing among expert evaluators, plays in generating conservative decisions. We executed two field experiments in two separate grant-funding opportunities at a leading research university, mobilizing 369 evaluators from seven universities to evaluate 97 projects, resulting in 761 proposal-evaluation pairs and more than $250,000 in awards. We exogenously varied the relative valence (positive and negative) of others' scores and measured how exposures to higher and lower scores affect the focal evaluator's propensity to change their initial score. We found causal evidence of a negativity bias, where evaluators their scores by more points after seeing scores more than their own rather than them after seeing more scores. Qualitative coding of the evaluators' justifications for score changes reveals that exposures to lower scores were associated with greater attention to uncovering weaknesses, whereas exposures to neutral or higher scores were associated with increased emphasis on nonevaluation criteria, such as confidence in one's judgment. The greater power of negative information suggests that information sharing among expert evaluators can lead to more conservative allocation decisions that favor protecting against failure rather than maximizing success.

摘要

新项目的评估与选择是科技创新的核心所在,然而对于诸如保守主义等偏见的担忧一直存在。本文研究了评估形式,特别是专家评估者之间的信息共享,在做出保守决策中所起的作用。我们在一所顶尖研究型大学的两个不同的资助机会中进行了两项实地实验,动员了来自七所大学的369名评估者对97个项目进行评估,产生了761对提案评估结果以及超过25万美元的奖励。我们外生地改变他人分数的相对效价(正面和负面),并衡量接触更高和更低分数如何影响焦点评估者改变其初始分数的倾向。我们发现了消极偏见的因果证据,即评估者在看到比自己低的分数后比看到比自己高的分数后更大幅度地降低他们的分数。对评估者分数变化理由的定性编码显示,接触较低分数与更注重发现弱点相关,而接触中性或较高分数与更强调非评估标准(如对自己判断的信心)相关。负面信息的更大影响力表明,专家评估者之间的信息共享可能导致更保守的分配决策,这些决策倾向于防范失败而非追求成功最大化。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8965/9531843/899e226656fd/nihms-1798634-f0001.jpg

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