Fang Yinhai, Perc Matjaž, Zhang Hui
College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Forestry University, Nanjing 210037, People's Republic of China.
Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia.
R Soc Open Sci. 2022 Nov 9;9(11):221148. doi: 10.1098/rsos.221148. eCollection 2022 Nov.
Digital technologies provide a convenient way for the public to participate in environmental governance. Therefore, by means of a two-stage evolutionary model, a new mechanism for promoting public cooperation is proposed to accomplish environmental collaborative governance. Interactive effects of government-enterprise environmental governance are firstly explored, which is the external atmosphere for public behaviour. Second, the evolutionary dynamics of public behaviour is analysed to reveal the internal mechanism of the emergence of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance projects. Simulations reveal that the interaction of resource elements between government and enterprise is an important basis for environmental governance performance, and that governments can improve this as well as public cooperation by increasing the marginal governance propensity. Similarly, an increase in the government's fixed expenditure item of environmental governance can also significantly improve government-enterprise performance and public cooperation. And finally, the effect of government's marginal incentive propensity on public environmental governance is moderated by enterprises' marginal environmental governance propensity, so that simply increasing the government's marginal incentive propensity cannot improve the evolutionary stable state of public behaviour under the scenario where enterprises' marginal environmental governance propensity is low.
数字技术为公众参与环境治理提供了便捷途径。因此，借助两阶段演化模型，提出了一种促进公众合作的新机制以实现环境协同治理。首先探究政府-企业环境治理的交互效应，这是公众行为的外部氛围。其次，分析公众行为的演化动态，以揭示环境协同治理项目中公众合作出现的内在机制。模拟结果表明，政府与企业之间资源要素的相互作用是环境治理绩效的重要基础，政府可以通过提高边际治理倾向来改善这一点以及公众合作。同样，政府环境治理固定支出项目的增加也能显著提高政府-企业绩效和公众合作。最后，政府边际激励倾向对公众环境治理的影响受到企业边际环境治理倾向的调节，以至于在企业边际环境治理倾向较低的情景下，单纯提高政府边际激励倾向并不能改善公众行为的演化稳定状态。
